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And This Just In...
Marlene Fernandez

t has been said th at all the
m edia cares about is blood,
money, sex, drugs and rock
’n ’ roll. N ot quite - bu t not
too far from the truth.

I

M edia coverage is indeed crisis-oriented: death, destruction and
disaster make a story. We cover
change, n o t continuity; crisis, not
steady im provem ent; individuals,
no t societal change. News is, “Man
bites dog,” n o t “Dog bites m an .”
In the case o f U.S. coverage on
Latin America, traditionally, a story
is weighted, n o t according to the
degree o f real im pact in the coun
try, b u t to the degree o f U.S.
involvem ent in that particular story.
Ever since the 1950s, when the com 
m unist th reat was well and alive,
and Latin America was ground for
ideological confrontation; ever
since the CIA-supported military
coup in Guatemala, the Bay o f Pigs,
support for m ilitary regimes, and
covert wars in Central America, the
story was not what Latin America
was experiencing, b u t the degree of
wrongdoing, complicity, or viola
tions o f U.S. law.
Today, this tren d continues, and
added to the list are stories which
play on Am erican fears — d ru g traf
ficking, low-paying maquiladoras that
“steal” Am erican jobs, illegal immi
gration and attacks on U.S. citizens
living in Latin America.
N othing illustrates this better
than the recent Guatemala-CIA
Marlene Fernandez is bureau chieffor
CNN Spanish. This commentary is an
excerpt of a speech to the Thirteenth
A nnual Journalists and Editors
Workshop, April 20-21, 1995, held at
T he Miami Herald.
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scandal. For m onths, Jennifer
Harbury, the widow o f an indige
nous G uatem ala guerrilla, went to
extrem es, resorting to h unger
strikes, protests and rallies in an
attem pt to attract the attention of
the press into covering the disap
pearance o f h er husband in
Guatemala.
The story was reported, b u t did
not make front page until
C ongressm an R obert Torricelli of
the House Intelligence Com m ittee
released inform ation which linked
the CIA to the scandal. It was
the possibility o f w rongdoing by
the intelligence agency which
m ade it a big story to the U.S.
media.
Just before com ing to Miami, I
asked CNN’s anchor Reid Collins
how he viewed U.S. m edia coverage
o f Latin Am erica in 1995. His
response was revealing.
“It would be nice to see m ore
noncrisis news of the region to
relieve the im pression that Latin
Am erica careens from one catastro
p he to another,” said Collins. “As
we know,” he continued, “this is not
in the cards so long as the viewers’
appetite continues to expect what it
has been w hetted on - trouble.”
And here lies the core of the
point I want to make. In the
rem aining m onths of 1995 and in
the years to come, I expect a
decline in the intensity o f Latin
Am erican coverage by the U nited
States English media.
Latin America is moving toward
free m arket dem ocracies, toward
m ore open political systems. This is
good news, and that is the problem .
Good new is hard to cover. It is dif
ficult for an editor to justify stories
on steady progress in Chile, a coun

try with econom ic growth o f 7 p er
cent a year. It is m uch easier to
dedicate energy to the collapse of
the Mexican peso, a story that has
im plications in the U nited States,
not to m ention the im pact on the
em erging countries all the way
down to the S outhern Cone.
Calamity is what makes a story, or
at least the possibility o f one.
Mexico is a top story. T here is a
great deal to be re p o rted about
Mexico: w hether it will com e out of
the peso crisis intact; w hether
social unrest will settle; or w hether
the crisis will eventually support a
wave o f illegal im m igration. Still to
be answered is the degree to which
drug traffickers have infiltrated the
governm ent. T here are unfinished
investigations of m ajor political
assassinations. But Mexico is a big
story not so m uch because o f its
im portance as a Latin American
country, bu t because o f its sheer
proxim ity to the U nited States.
U.S. coverage of Latin America is
n o t driven solely by what is h ap p en 
ing in the region. Now that m ajor
television networks do n o t have
bureaus in the area - forcing corre
spondents to cover ten countries at
a time - coverage decisions are dri
ven by what W ashington is doing in
term s o f policy.
Cuba will be covered m uch m ore
extensively in the com ing m onths;
th at’s because the U.S. has decisions
to make. T he real questions are:
what is the fate o f thousands of
C uban refugees in G uantanam o,
and should the em bargo rem ain or
be lifted? T here is also debate on
what the adm inistration will do in
relation to the Burton-Helm s bill
that puts sanctions on com panies
dealing with Cuba.
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Issues to watch for

In reality, Cuba deserves m uch
m ore attention than it has been
given. The last time we heard
extensively about Cuba was during
the refugee crisis. Many develop
m ents h ap pening right now are
being ignored. Unfortunately, some
believe that there is no story in
Cuba w ithout a resurgence o f a mas
sive flow o f refugees to the coasts of
Florida o r absent the fall of Fidel
Castro from power.
W hen that happens there is no
do u b t that coverage will be massive.
As Don Ham ilton, head o f the Latin
Am erican division at the U.S.
Inform ation Agency pu t it, “Even
though Cuba does n o t represent a
national security threat anymore,
even though the cold war is over,
Fidel, like M adonna, will always
attract the press.” This is true; the
press never misses the moves of
celebrities. Fidel Castro, a contro
versial, com pelling character, is
treated as such.
D rug trafficking as an issue for
press coverage could gain im por
tance as the debate for the U.S.
presidential election heats up. We
have already h eard conservative
Republicans urging a tougher
stance from the cu rrent adm inistra
tion toward the drug-producing
countries o f Latin America. The
R epublicans - who perceive the cur
ren t d ru g policy as a weakness of
the Clinton adm inistration - see
the topic o f drugs as an issue that
can provide them political advan
tage.
This coincides with stronger
voices in Latin America urging
W ashington to see this issue from
an o th er perspective. I ju st re tu rn ed
from a trip to Peru, where I covered
the presidential election. President

A lberto Fujimori w ondered why the
U.S. m edia does no t concentrate on
the tons o f cocaine that are still able
to en ter the country. H e com 
plained about the lack of stories
regarding the network in the U.S.
that facilitates the entrance and dis
tribution o f drugs.
The growing anti-im m igration
feelings in the U nited States will be
an o th er issue as the electoral debate
in the U nited States draws near. The
m edia will probably re p o rt m ore
about isolationist sentim ents.
We will also probably hear m ore
about Jesse Helms, given his new
power chairing the Senate Foreign
Relations Com m ittee and his
strong feelings about certain Latin
Am erican issues. As a m atter of
fact, one o f my colleagues at CNN
describes Mr. Helms as the “political
Molotov cocktail” for foreign policy
initiatives: N ot strong enough to
destroy them , bu t strong enough to
cause trouble.
W hat the m edia has no t focused
on yet is the threat o f social polar
ization in Latin America. While
most governm ents in the region are
successfully pushing through neolib
eral econom ic reform s, social needs
pay a price. The reform s are h u rt
ing the poor disproportionately. If
this problem is no t addressed, we
could be seeing social explosions
throughout Latin America. We saw
a small exam ple o f this on April 18,
when the governm ent o f Bolivia
had to declare a state of siege to
control discontent in the working
class.
In the m eantim e, since the atten
tion of the U.S. m edia in foreign
affairs still focuses on security prob
lems, Latin America will appear less
in the news than Russia, C hina or

the Middle East. If reporting
reflects that reality, Latin America
will continue second tier after Asia
and Europe, though it will probably
fare better than Africa.
Not everyone, however, sees the
relative silence o f coverage o f Latin
America as som ething negative.
Frank Sesno, CNN anchor and
deputy bureau chief in W ashington,
thinks that to some extent this
m ight be healthy.
“We are living in a transitional
perio d ,” he said. “I am optimistic
that this time will serve to help the
m edia evolve from the xenophobic
coverage, which in the past charac
terized Latin Am erica as a g roup of
‘B anana Republics in turm oil,’ into
a m ore com plex reporting where
Am ericans will begin to appreciate
that the well-being of the Am erican
worker indeed depends u p o n what
happens in Mexico.”
We at CNN have adopted this phi
losophy by consistently opening
m ore bureaus in Latin Am erica and
expanding o u r Spanish language
coverage to six shows a day. CNN
Spanish is fundam entally interested
in covering social issues and long
term trends in the region. We are
closely watching the efforts o f Latin
Am erican countries to diversify
their econom ies and open their
markets.
But, as we all know, coverage of
these kinds of stories involves m ore
reportorial skill, m ore reporting
time, and, consequently, m ore
money. It is all worth it. Americans
would benefit from the knowledge
that El Salvador is still in C entral
America, and that Guatem ala exists
before and after Congressm an
Torricelli. ■
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Commentary

The Mote in Thy Brother’s Eye...
D aniel Samper Pizano

he world’s nations are
not unlike schoolchild
The problem is that every
ren: Every so often they
time it refuses to certify a
must show proof that
nation, the United States
they deserve a goodconduct certificate. In
gains international trade
the case of schoolchildren, that cer
advantages.
tificate is granted by the hall monitor.
In the case of the world's nations, the
grantor is the U nited States, whose
In the same way that countries
governm ent draws up — in
plagued by organized crim e are
Olympian conceit — a list of good
handed a list of requirem ents to
and bad nations that inhabit this
m eet in order to please the grantor
planet. The problem is that every
o f diplomas, there should be mini
time it refuses to certify a nation, the
m um requirem ents set down for
United States gains international
nations that presum e to instruct oth
trade advantages. It’s as if a teacher
ers in probity. The country in ques
were entitled to take hom e the books
tion:
and bicycle of any student to whom
the teacher refused to give a hall
1) Must show p ro o f o f its ability to
pass.
com bat the drug trade. If nar
The countries most severely sub
cotics consum ption in its own
jected to the arbitrariness o f the
backyard increases, it is ill-pre“m onitor o f the N orth” are those that
pared to instruct others on how
are plagued by drug trafficking. It’s
not enough for them to suffer the
to curb it.
violence and the corruption of the
2) Must not have any elected may
drug cartels; they must also put up
ors known to be drug addicts or
with the whims of the exam iner in
to prom ote drug use.
Washington. W henever certification
time nears, these sorry nations must
3) Above all, must not have any re
wait for the m urder of a few judges
elected mayors with a drugor cabinet ministers, and hope for
related prison record.
drug-related terrorist attacks that
leave at least 20 citizens blown to bits.
4) Should no t perm it the cultiva
Otherwise the m onitor m ight refuse
tion o f m arijuana on its soil, or
to award the good-conduct medal. If
the production o f hallucinogens
things continue as they are now, it
in its laboratories, or the export
m ight be wiser to establish good-con
of those venoms to o ther coun
duct certification for the medal giver.
It would be only fair. Someone
tries.
should watch the watchman.
5) Must quash the laundering of
drug money.
Daniel Samper Pizano is a Colombian
journalist. This article is reprinted
6) Must not perm it the uncon
with the permission of the author.
trolled sale of chemical sub
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stances needed to process
cocaine or heroin.
7)

Should not preten d that drug
use is lim ited to movie, rock
music, and television circles.
Rem em ber Wall Street.

8)

Should not sell weapons to
drug traffickers so that they may
slay authorities in countries
where drugs are produced.

9)

Should be untainted by allega
tions that (a) drugs have been
consum ed in the presidential
palace; (b) narcotics have been
purchased by secret service
agents; (c) drugs have been
traded for weapons to com bat
communism; (d) its authorities
have connived with drug traf
fickers; (e) presidents and Mafia
or other organized-crime figures
have had secret understandings.

10) Must not offer reduced sen
tences to im prisoned drug deal
ers in exchange for u n tru e state
m ents to support the claims of
anti-drug officials.
11) Must not block, for selfish rea
sons, the im portation of legal
products from countries that
attem pt to replace coca or
poppy plantations with other
crops that will benefit that
region.
12) Must never have sponsored
assassination attem pts or terror
ist acts in other countries for
political reasons.
13) May not perm it the bribing of
foreign authorities.

Commentary

...and nose

14) Must employ alert and honest
air traffic controllers, capable of
spotting airplanes that enter its
air space carrying illicit cargo.

HAHR

15) Must guarantee the incorrupt
ibility of its customs agents.
16) Must be able to state that it does
not pressure the m edia to dis
seminate self-serving information
about events in other countries.

Hispanic American Historical Review
Mark Szuchman, editor
Published in cooperation with the C onference on Latin
A m erican H istory of the A m erican Historical Association
Recent and forthcoming articles in 1995

17) Must be hom e to a press corps
that strictly observes the ethical
rule of giving the defendant
an opportunity to defend him 
self.
18) Must have captured a large
n um ber of drug-traffic chief
tains in the past 12 months.
19) Should be able to guarantee (as
m inim um p ro o f of its struggle
against drug trafficking) that
no drugs are sold inside its
prisons.
20) May n o t pocket 80 cents on
each drug-related dollar.
21) Should n o t prop up, for reasons
of political convenience, sinister
T hird World characters involved
in drug trafficking.
To me, it does n o t seem excessive
to dem and that only those countries
th at m eet these basic requirem ents
may issue good-conduct certificates
to their equals in the war against
drugs. Let those that d o n ’t m eet
them go to reform school. And let
the read er ju d g e if W ashington has
any authority to han d out m oral
diplomas. ■
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The “Dem os” in Democracy
George C. Biddle

n January 24,
enraged and frustrat
ed by the govern
m en t’s delay in car
rying ou t prom ised
social program s for
dem obilized soldiers, over
com batants representing the
Association of the Demobilized of
the A rm ed Forces o f El Salvador
(ADEFAES) forcibly occupied the
Legislative Assembly and the
Finance Ministry in San Salvador.
T he protesters took 13 m em bers of
Congress and 70 governm ent
employees hostage. After two days
of negotiations with the governm ent
and ONUSAL (U nited Nations
O bserver Mission in El Salvador),
the ex-com batants abandoned their
positions and released the hostages.
Ex-Sergeant Mauricio C ornejo, who
led the negotiations for ADEFAES,
said the deal that was struck includ
ed governm ent promises to provide
land, credit, training and housing
for 5,000 form er m em bers o f the
Salvadoran A rm ed Forces.
This violent action represented
the fourth time since D ecem ber of
1993 that ADEFAES, an organiza
tion o f 15,000, had seized the
Assembly, underscoring the fragility
o f the peace process and the diffi
culty o f achieving lasting reconcilia
tion in El Salvador. In a recant con
versation, Ana G uadalupe M artinez,

O

George C. Biddle is the president of the
Washington-based Institute for Central
American Studies (ICAS). ICAS pro
vided technical assistance in establish
ing Centro DEMOS and continues to
assist it in many aspects of its pro
gram.
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form er guerrilla leader and now
vice president o f the Legislative
Assembly, said that she sees a
change in the m entality o f leaders
and groups across the political and
ideological spectrum . M artinez
1,000
fears ex
that traditional viewpoints are
resurfacing and that the polariza
tion of Salvadoran society is increas
ing, no t decreasing. As evidence of
this, she pointed to the recent em er
gence of a num ber of new political
parties. “T here is too m uch o rth o 
doxy on the right and the left - no
one wants to listen,” she noted.
W orking to build a lasting peace
after a 12-year civil war that claimed
m ore than 75,000 lives, El Salvador
is also confronting a long history of
intolerance, econom ic disparity, and
violence. T hree years after the end
o f the war, it is evident that divisive
ness and violence rem ain realities.
To succeed in constructing a peace
ful, dem ocratic society, Salvadorans
will have to be vigilant in their com 
m itm ent to com m unication, u n d er
standing and com prom ise.
O ne week after the conclusion of
the dram atic events at the Legis
lative Assembly, ex-Sergeant
C ornejo approached the C enter for
Strategic Studies for Strengthening
Salvadoran Democracy, known in
Spanish as C entro DEMOS, and
asked if he could becom e a partici
p ant in the ce n te r’s annual course
for national leaders which had
begun the previous November. He
was accepted as a midyear partici
pant.
C entro DEMOS is a nonpartisan
organization which sponsors an
intensive academ ic course that
brings together leaders from the dif
ferent sectors of Salvadoran society
to attend lectures, discuss interna

tional and national issues, and
becom e better inform ed about the
problem s confronting El Salvador.
Based in San Salvador, the center is
unique because it provides a neu
tral, pluralistic forum for sustained
study, dialogue and debate in a soci
ety known for its polarity. Through
sustained interaction, C entro
DEMOS strives to respond to the
urgent need for m utual u n derstand
ing, tolerance and reconciliation
am ong the diverse interests o f the
fragm ented Salvadoran society.
The DEMOS initiative is based on
the prem ise that El Salvador will not
develop peacefully and dem ocrati
cally until the com peting interests
in society know and understand
each o ther and begin to rely on
open discussion of differences,
negotiation strategies and com pro
mise rather than hostile or destruc
tive confrontations. As one observ
er o f the center pu t it, civil society
“will be strengthened to the extent
to which each sector broadens its
horizons and learns to understand,
tolerate and accept political, philo
sophical and ideological solutions
o ther than its own.” T he ce n te r’s
goal is to establish, m aintain and
consolidate horizontal lines of com
m unication am ong society’s differ
en t interest groups in o rd er to mini
mize the potential for violent con
frontation and polarization and
explore the possibilities for coopera
tion, developm ent and consensual
problem solving.
C entro DEMOS’ m ethodology is
straightforward. T he center invites
60 associations, institutions, organi
zations, political parties and govern
m ent bodies to select a senior rep re
sentative to participate in its annual
course. Ideally, the center wants to
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attract em erging leaders who can
represent their sector from a posi
tion o f authority and who will
rem ain in a leadership position for
some time to come. T he 78 partici
pants in this year’s course include
representatives from labor, business,
cam pesino organizations, universi
ties, religious institutions, the mili
tary, various branches o f govern
m ent, most political parties, NGOs,
professional associations and special
interest groups. T he widest range
o f social, political and econom ic
perspectives is represented.
C entro DEMOS brings these lead
ers together three days a week for
five hours per day over an eightm onth period in a specially
designed conference room at the
Salvadoran Association o f Engineers
and Architects. This year’s course
began on November 10, 1994 and
en d ed on Ju n e 15th - 91 sessions in
all. The participants are paid a
small stipend for attendance at each
session. C entro DEMOS is an inclu
sive organization and wants to
ensure there is no discrim ination
based on financial ability.
The curriculum for the course is
designed by the cen ter’s staff and is
divided into three stages. Stage one
analyzes the present international
situation, El Salvador’s place in the
world and im portant general con
cepts such as the rule of law, m od
ernization o f the state and sustain
able developm ent, to nam e a few.
Stage two focuses on the critical
econom ic, social, political, military
and geographic issues facing El
Salvador. T he prim ary topics in
each o f these areas are selected by a
dem ocratic vote o f all the participat
ing groups. This year’s topics
include: “T he New Role o f the

A im ed Forces;” “T he World
Economy and the Effects of
NAFTA;” “T he Political Party
System: T he Only Way to Access
Political Power?;” “Integral Social
Developm ent;” and “T he Ju d g m en t
o f the International C ourt of
Justice: Its Im plications.” T he final
stage of the curriculum is devoted
to the theory, m ethodology and
application o f strategic analysis and
planning. D uring this im portant
stage, the participants study differ
ent approaches to strategic problem
solving and apply them to the issues
they have analyzed th ro u g h o u t the
course. This allows the diverse
group of participants the op p o rtu n i
ty to address difficult problem s
together and apply alternative solu
tions to the challenges facing
Salvadoran society.

The express purpose of
the project’s design is to
maximize the potential of
sustained face to face
dialogue.

Each session of the course typical
ly begins with a plenary conference
in which a diverse group o f interna
tional and national experts present
differing views on the given topic.
This is followed by a question and
answer period and then a brief
break for dinner, where the partici
pants can interact informally. After
the break, they divide into four
working groups to analyze and
debate the presentations as well as
present their own distinct views. At

the en d o f the session, they recon
vene in a plenary forum to discuss
and debate the findings o f the work
ing groups.
C entro DEMOS attem pts n o t only
to educate and widen the horizons
of the individual participants, it also
provides the initial point o f contact
to enhance interaction am ong com
peting sectors within El Salvador the very essence o f civil society.
Participants learn as m uch from one
an o th er as they do from the guest
speakers. Simply put, the express
purpose o f the project’s design is to
maximize the potential of sustained
face to face dialogue - thus the
intensity and the length o f the
course. T he ultim ate sviccess of
peace and dem ocracy in El Salvador
depends on the ability o f the differ
ent sectors o f society to com m uni
cate m ore effectively and, at the
very m inim um , to listen to, u n d er
stand and tolerate opposing view
points.
C entro DEMOS is by no m eans a
panacea. It is bu t one m echanism
am ong countless that are need ed to
strengthen civil society and sustain
the process of peace and reconcilia
tion in El Salvador. The DEMOS
initiative does no t preten d to effect
radical change am ong individuals or
to solve all the country’s problem s.
It does, however, strive to provide
an environm ent conducive to m odi
fying attitudes. A lthough attitudinal
changes are difficult to m easure,
there have been some tangible and
positive results.
O ne piece o f anecdotal evidence
is particularly moving. O ne o f the
participants from the Legislative
Assembly this year is Francisco
M ena Sandoval. D uring the war,
Sandoval defected to the insurgents
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One
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from the A rm ed Forces, where he
had been a captain. While in the
army, he served u n d e r the com 
m and o f then Colonel Mauricio
Vargas, who later becam e a General,
Deputy C hief of Staff, and the
A rm ed Forces representative to the
peace negotiations. As com m ander
o f a guerrilla unit during the war,
Sandoval led an attack on the
Army’s Second Brigade at Santa
Ana, which at the time was defend
ed by C olonel Vargas. D uring the
battle that ensued, Sandoval shot
Vargas in the arm . The two had
never spoken or reconciled until
this year, when Vargas came to
speak at C entro DEMOS. Following
Vargas’s presentation, the staff at
DEMOS b ro ught the two m en
together. In an em otional exchange
in front o f o th er participants, they
shook hands and talked briefly.
A nother exam ple o f C entro
DEMOS’ im pact is the recent cre
ation o f an association of C entro
DEMOS graduates. Alumni from
C entro DEMOS’ first course have
established their own organization
to continue th eir dialogue and
interaction. M ore importantly, they
have form ed working groups with
broad representation to address spe
cific problem s facing the country.
O ne group is working with students
from the National University to
develop approaches to stem the
growing tide of gang violence,
an o th er is working with H abitat for
Hum anity to help m eet the need for
low-cost housing (in fact a majority
o f the national board of H abitat is
com prised o f DEMOS graduates),
and the final group is working on
an AIDS prevention campaign.
C entro DEMOS was not an easy
organization to establish. It
required a great deal o f determ ina
tion and political will. Presently, the
center is governed by a foundation,
FUNDEMOS, which is com prised of
a variety of Salvadoran leaders,
am ong them Jo aq u in Villalobos, a
form er com m ander o f the FMLN
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One

and a leader of the Democratic
Party; Saul Suster, form er director
of ANTEL, the telephone com pany
and one of form er President
Alfredo Cristiani’s closest advisors;
and Father Walter G uerra, director
of CARITAS for C entral America
and Mexico. Just like the partici
pants and the foundation, the staff
also reflects the diversity of
Salvadoran society.
Until now, the C enter has been
entirely financed by the U.S. Agency
for International Development.
C entro DEMOS is working to attract
support from others in the interna
tional com m unity as well as from
within El Salvador. To do this, the
center m ust continue to be vigilant
in m aintaining its nonpartisanship
and the quality o f its academ ic
course. If this occurs, C entro
DEMOS can continue to play a con
structive role by building bridges
am ong distinct interests in El
Salvador.

Centro DEMOS’ methodology and
structure leave it open as a model
that may prove replicable and effec
tive in other societies facing similar
challenges as El Salvador. W ithout
question, the needs of each society
and the conditions within each coun
try are distinct. W here the political
will exists, however, the Centro
DEMOS approach could be used suc
cessfully to strengthen democracy,
civil society and peace.
It remains to be seen w hether exSergeant Cornejo and ADEFAES will
change their approach. At the very
least, through C entro DEMOS,
Cornejo will be exposed to dem ocra
tic dialogue and the gam ut of opin
ions and interests in the country.
Already, im portant back channel
com m unication is occurring between
him and another participant,
Edgardo Zelaya, an ARENA deputy
in the Legislative Assembly. This can
only serve to aid the cause of conflict
prevention, democracy and peace. ■
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Chronicle of a Death Foretold
Yvon Grenier

ntellectuals are producers
an d dissem inators o f political
ideas. A lthough the concept
was coined less than a centu
ry ago in France during the
Dreyfus affair, the intellectu
al’s libido dominandi has im m em ori
al roots: one recalls antiquity’s
philosopher-king; the professor of
the M iddle Ages (called “dictatore”) ,
craving to rule C hristendom ; the
reckless philosophe surfing on the
waves o f the F rench revolution.
T h ere were also gurus, artists and,
m ore recently, social scientists, all
with som ething in com m on: an
aspiration to define the way people
are governed.
Perhaps because all definitions of
intellectuals are self-definitions, as
Zygmunt Baum an pointed out, they
also ten d to com e with a thesaurus
o f self-laudatory features. Intellec
tuals are free-spirited rebels and
would ra th e r sip hem lock than
ren o u n ce th eir muse, freedom .
Money and power? These hovering
giants, like B audelaire’s albatross,
scorn such worldly tem ptations.
But facts are h ard things.
Intellectuals have cheered for a
variety o f Spartas (if possible from
some decadently dem ocratic
A thens) m ore often than they care
to rem em ber. They could easily be
singled out, over the ages, as the
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m ost enthusiastic devotees o f the
bonfire, guillotine, re-education
camps, and o th er purifying devices.
In fact, the case could probably be
m ade that dictatorship, being the
trium ph o f an idea, is a m uch m ore
“n atu ra l” option for an intellectual
than any form of open society,
m ade o f hollow procedures and
ignoble com prom ises am ong ordi
nary people. Finally, because the
intelligentsia is a form o f nobility, it
usually loves social deference and
considers em ancipation from m ate
rial preoccupations as a natural
right.

The obsession with
“facts, ” curiously, exists
in a genuine world of
fantasy, with its own
rules, intellectual
currents, temple, etc.
Fortunately, there are quite a few
exceptions to this rule, the
Dreyfusards themselves being the
first and m ost illustrious one. In
their quest for the foundation o f a
“new society,” intellectuals have
den o u n ced real injustices in their
own country and abroad.
Nevertheless, because m ost o f the
W estern great thinkers have
espoused some form o f ideocracy,
sh o u ld n ’t we welcome the fact that
the intellectual - that is, the func
tion o f the intellectual - is th reat
ened by extinction alm ost every
where? Before reaching any con
clusion on this, some clarifications
are w arranted.

P r o f e s s io n a l s

and

G endelettres

It is useful to distinguish intellec
tuals from eith er professionals (tecnicos) or gendelettres (persons o f let
ters). Professionals are those highly
com petent persons in the technical
sense, who do no t wield influence
outside o f their specific discipline.
Gendelettres, on the o th er hand, can
be defined as highly cultivated but
contem plative individuals whose
influence on public affairs is either
nil or unintentional. From these
idealized types one can analyze the
social function o f some relevant
social actors: how m uch o f a p ro 
fessional a n d /o r ideologue a m an
agem ent guru is, for instance. A
social scientist is arguably a com bi
nation o f professional and intellec
tual - m ore o f the form er in N orth
America, m ore o f the latter in Latin
America. An intellectual, even a
politician, has to be a bit o f a gendelettre in Europe, a bit o f a profes
sional in N orth America, and so on.
The extinction o f intellectuals does
no t equate with eith er anti-intellectualism or a renunciation o f the
em ancipatory power o f knowledge.
It m eans the disappearance o f the
kind o f social actor whose dom i
n an t feature is to be an intellectual:
i.e. to seek political influence and
status through the power o f ideas.
C a se S t u d y : T

he

A m e r ic a s

The American continent, featur
ing different fragm ents o f the
European m atrix as well as h etero
geneous patterns o f developm ent,
offers a contrasted tableau o f the
conditions conducive to the blos
soming or extinction o f intellectuals
in our times. T he diagnosis: (a)
intellectuals are a curiosity in the
U.S. and English Canada; (b) they
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Intellectuals in the Americas

are in decline in Ladn America; but
(c) they are still vigorous in the
mostly French-speaking Canadian
province o f Quebec.
Fa r e w e l l

to

I ntellectuals

“As m odernity advances, the intel
lectual retreats,” says P. Nettl.
Moreover, “The social scientist, far
from being a new form of intellectu
al, may really be his m ortal enemy
as well as his replacem ent in soci
ety.” Why? For Nettl, “T he intellec
tual's role in [advanced Western]
society has been un d erm ined pri
marily by increasing specialization,
by different b u t professional
groundings of authority, by separa
tion between culture and politics,
and the breakup o f unitary cultures
- or at least the hierarchy o f better
as opposed to worse culture.” To
this list drawn up in the 1960s we
should now annex the relative and
probably transitory retreat of
antiliberal ideologies in the West.
Intellectuals have no political
space: politicians and lobbyists
m onopolize access to political
power. T he m edia play the role of
interm ediary between the political
class and the apathetic masses.
Would-be intellectuals despise the
media. T he m edia ignore them . In
the cities, a “new knowledge class”
(Peter Berger) o f “lifestyle engi
n eers” (Hansfried Kellner) or
“m oral en trep ren eu rs” (James
H unter) strives to shape specific
social activities or “issues” (the envi
ronm ent, gender, taxes, etc.).
However, their im pact rem ains
ephem eral and particularistic, hav
ing m ore to do with m arketing a
pro d u ct than shaping the res publica.
Social scientists, m ost o f the time,
are quasi-intellectuals. But the

m o d ern social scientist is primarily,
as Max W eber anticipated, an over
specialized professional. This is
particularly true in N orth America,
w here the quest for professional
ized social sciences (i.e., the expul
sion o f value judgem ents) has been
dom inant. Lewis Feuer recalls that
during the 1950s in Anglo-Saxon
countries, “To call a person an
‘intellectual’ was to suggest that this
was an educated person who had
failed to com plete his work, who
lacked discipline, who had intellect
but not character; he was n eith er a
scientist n o r a scholar; a frivolous
erudite: in short, a Parisian.” This
celebration o f science com es with a
certain estrangem ent from social
practices, an im perviousness to the
ideological cycles that shape the
public debate. (For example, the
U.S. now im ports massively from
the French social sciences o f the
1960s, now totally demode in
France). T he notion o f “magic
realism", presum ably m ore suited to
characterize Latin A m erican litera
ture, captures the n ature o f this
university-based Republique des lettres.
The obsession with “facts,” curious
ly, exists in a genuine world of fan
tasy, with its own rules, intellectual
currents, tem ples, etc.
In the 1960s, the counterculture
m ovem ent, sweeping a whole gener
ation in W estern countries, opened
a parenthesis in the Am erican tradi
tion. A new quest for com m unity
and some generational tribalism,
coupled with timely political insta
bility, generated extraordinary
social and political fluidity. Gore
Vidal recalls this period nostalgical
ly w hen “politics and literature offi
cially jo in e d forces. T he politician
had literary longings; the w riter saw

him self as presid en t.” A perfect
time for intellectuals! Still, this was
typically followed by a certain n o r
malization, a decline o f the revolu
tionary fervor. Capitalism o p en ed
its purse to a prom ising self-centered generation, whereas the
Dem ocratic Party displaced its
hegem onic center from the New
Deal coalition to “new politics” and
a newly affluent generation.
Arguably, the only situation
am enable to converting politically
autistic intellectuals into movers
and shakers in this kind o f environ
m ent is one o f deep collective trau 
ma: external or intern al war, col
lapse o f political institutions, crisis
o f collective identity, nationalistic
upsurge, generational clash, etc.
Intellectuals should pray for the
advent of a new charism atic era,
one that would break the social grid
and renew the hum an com m unities
receptiveness to overarching social
myths and ideologies.
T h e D is t in c t T r a d it io n

Sociopolitical developm ent in
Latin Am erica has been m ore con
sonant with the active participation
o f intellectuals in the public sphere,
for a nu m b er o f reasons. First, one
has a distinctive p attern o f elite
reproduction. Elites in Latin
Am erica have typically been less dif
ferentiated and “functional,” or
m ore hom ogeneous than in N orth
America. In fact, Latin A m erica’s
elites are in many ways similar to
the E uropean continental m odel.
For instance, French elites ten d to
be cumulard: they accum ulate
social, political, cultural an d often
econom ic roles. Politicians who
aspire to the highest positions m ust
display some m astery o f lettres and
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One
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philosophy, a rem iniscence o f the
Middle Ages’ trivium o f gramm ar,
rhetoric and logic. All the same, in
Latin Am erica - w here power, not
wealth, is the pivotal resource - the
low differentiation o f elites is
salient am ong cultural and political
elites. Disciplines such as art or sci
ence are n o t fully m ilked until their
m astery is converted into some
political (or “public”) capital. Latin
Am erican universities, with their
em phasis on liberal professions, are
m ore suited to form ing homo politi
cos (the “su rro u n d ed m an ”
described by Glen C. Dealy) than
solitary scientifics and technicians
seeking im personal rewards.
Latin A m erican elites are no t a
loose collection o f interconnected
b u t distinct heads o f “functional
groups.” They form a fairly hom o
geneous and selective club of
rulers. Cultural, political, and eco
nom ic resources com m and social
deference, b u t those resources are
gran ted with, m ore than being a
prerequisite for, m em bership to the
club. Latin Am erican intellectuals
are largely defined by the n ature of
th eir relations with this club, to
which many belong or aspire to
belong. This explains why the cate
gory o f intellectual is so unspecific
in Latin America: as Jorge G.
Castaneda, after many others,
po in ted out: “Almost anyone who
writes, paints, acts, teaches, speaks
out, o r even sings, becom es an
‘intellectual’.” A society that values
what you are m ore than what you
do, and where the m astery o f uni
versal discourses com m and m ore
deference than instrum ental reason
and technical skills, is one where
intellectuals, all things being equal,
are m ore likely to find rewards for
th eir talents.
W hat is m ore, low levels o f social
m obilization also enhance the polit
ical influence of intellectuals. In
Latin America, the relatively low
level o f social m obilization and the
weakness of the indigenous en tre
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One

preneurial class confers to the ed u 
cated stratum , especially the cultur
al elites (including the intellectu
als), an inordinate pull vis-a-vis both
the governm ent and the masses.
Second, one has a distinctive pat
tern o f circulation of political elites.
In Latin America, as in m ost m od
ernizing countries, politics is m uch
less “institutionalized” and dem oc
ratic than in N orth Am erica (m inus
M exico). Political parties enjoy no
m onopoly in the business o f politi
cal representation and m obiliza
tion. As a m atter o f fact, o th er sea
soned “representative forces,” such
as the army, students, the church or
unions, have as m uch, if n o t m ore,
o f a legitim ate say in shaping poli
cies than regular politicians. This
kind o f setting invites all actors who
m aster political discourse (includ
ing, nowadays, social scientists) and
who enjoy organizational resources
to participate actively in politics.

With the emergence
and consolidation of
democracy in the region.,
intellectuals are likely to
lose groundretreating
into the professional or
gendelettres roles.

Interestingly enough, with the
em ergence an d consolidation of
dem ocracy in the region, coupled
with the disqualification of
Castroist-like political activism in
universities, intellectuals are likely
to lose ground, retreating into p ro 
fessional or gendelettres roles. Latin
A m erican social scientists are now
attem pting to em ulate the N orth
Am erican m odel, facing the new
dilem m a o f “publish or perish ”
instead o f “praxis and perish.”
They are m ore busy com peting for

scarce resources than for some
exclusive and entrancing position
in deciphering/revolutionizing la
realidad.
This im pressionistic po rtrait of
hem ispheric convergence deserves
to be qualified, however, because
of the resistance o f a small political
village in the northeast o f the
Am erican continent. In the
C anadian province o f Quebec,
vigorous Gaulois, arm ed with the
ancestral magic potion o f ethnic
nationalism , are staunchly staving
off the onslaughts o f disenchant
m ent and cultural fragm entation.
Q

uebec

Beyond the Latin heritage, the
mostly French-speaking province of
Q uebec arguably shares with Latin
A m erican societies a legacy o f belat
ed developm ent, and hence a cer
tain cult o f the state conceived both
as a guardian of national identity
and as the prim e agent o f m o d ern 
ization. A nother com m on feature
is the early convergence between
the Rom an Catholic C hurch and
the state. In Q uebec, this success
ful m arriage strongly co n trib u ted to
cem enting a “national cu ltu re” that
celebrates order, m onistic political
values, paternalism and p ro tectio n 
ism against unholy foreign influ
ences. Unlike English Canadians,
Q uebecois were n o t “b o rn free”:
the conservative an d traditional
provincial Prem ier Maurice
Duplessis (1936-39, 1944-59), who
ruled with the suppo rt o f a reac
tionary Catholic C hurch, h ad to be
uprooted. T he patricidal b ro th er
hood that launched the so-called
Q uiet Revolution in the 1960s con
sisted o f a group o f educated young
m en and women, who took a leave
o f absence from the C hurch or
Catholic educational institutions in
o rd e r to capture the state apparatus
and tu rn it (and ergo, themselves)
into the m odern, secular guardian
o f the collective identity. T he previ
ous generation offered little, if any,
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resistance: the so-called babyboom ers o f the postwar period were
ju st too num erous. A few colleges
and universities in two cities
(M ontreal and Q uebec) ch u rn ed
out the technocrats for the
takeover. Social scientists found
positions in commissions o f inquiry,
p lanning boards and halls o f gov
e rn m e n t - even before graduation.
They felt the warm em brace of a
society that n eed ed them . As in
Latin America, the state becam e the
m ain em ployer for social scientists.
In contrast with Latin America,
however, the vigorously growing
state had m oney to pay them .
O n the econom ic side o f the
Q uiet Revolution, the nationaliza
tion o f electricity in the 1960s
becam e the building block upon
which a new “cargo cult rhythm ”
was elaborated. For three decades,
the whole C reole ru ling elite in
Q uebec w orshiped the huge dams
o f th e wild N orth, swearing to
d efend the “integrity o f the Q uebec
territo ry ” against aboriginal territo 
rial claims. T he flooded N orth is
conceived as a repository of
Q uebecois crude power, refined by
the post-clerical Leviathan. Thanks
to Hydro Q uebec (as in Mexico
with PEM EX), the illusion o f the
state’s self-sustainability could be
created. T he national bourgeoisie
will eventually rise and play its his
torical role, b u t only thanks to the
real dem iurge: th e national tech
nocracy.
T he love story between this gen
eration o f technocrats and the state
(th at is, the love story o f a genera
tion o f technocrats with itself) is
now reaching its baroque d en o u e
m en t with the election o f the sepa
ratist Parti Quebecois (PQ) in 1994.
T he P Q seeks the “n o rm al” sequel
to the quiet revolution: an inde
p en d en t, full-grown nation state.
A nd intellectuals are asked to
ch u rn out “identity” products, to
design new institutional constructs,
to figure out strategies and tactics

for before, during, and after the
H om eric referendum of Q uebec
sovereignty (due this year). Most of
the Q uebec intellectuals, old and
young, have already been “national
ized.” T he artists, cherished by the
Q uebec population, relish O ttaw a’s
no-strings-attached largess.
Nevertheless, their com m itm ent to
separation rem ains virtually m anda
tory in le Q uebec. In short, intel
lectuals have a 19th century-like
mission to accomplish: to erect a
nation-state and to strengthen a
national culture.
English Canadians find it m uch
h ard er to relate to one state, one
territory, one culture, one nation.
They are a dispersed lot, breathing
through a maze o f diverse, som e
times conflicting, identities.
English C anada is a natural federa
tion. In the country as a whole, the
N ational Energy Program did not
have the same im pact as the n ation
alization o f electricity in Quebec.
In fact, it created an opportunity
for intra-elite disputes, fostering
division am ong provinces and
regions. T here was no revolution,
even a quiet one. In term s o f “civic
cu ltu re” or political values (percep
tion o f the role o f the state, the role
of business, C hurch and politics,
etc.), English C anada can probably
be located som ewhere between
Q uebec and the U.S., and leaning
m ore toward the latter.
Social sciences in English C anada
were never the kind o f Confucian
wisdom they becam e in Q uebec
during the Q uiet Revolution.
Social scientists, especially econo
mists, were recruited in provincial
and federal bureaucracies, bu t they
never captured the state the way a
generation o f educated Quebecois
did. Key disciplines such as sociolo
gy and political science were insti
tutionalized in the 1960s and 1970s
- that is, decades after their US
counterparts - bu t with some diffi
culty. Political science, for exam 
ple, was perceived as the unfortu

nate child o f philosophy (contem 
plative) and econom ics (purely
technocratic).
Culturally, English C anada is
m ore perm eable to A m erican influ
ence and m uch m ore self-conscious
about it. Soft anti-Americanism is
the m inim al com m on den o m in ato r
o f English C anadian political cul
ture; not the privilege o f the left as
in Q uebec. Scholars and journalists
routinely argue w hether there is
such a thing as a C anadian culture;
recently, the C anadian M inister of
M ulticulturalism held that there
wasn’t. Clearly, the evocation of
C anada's kindness and com passion,
enshrined in our social program s, is
n o t enough. Consequently, there
seems to be room for the em er
gence of nationalist intellectuals in
English Canada, if only the overar
ching conditions for such a devel
opm ent were there. T he disruption
created by an eventual (though
unlikely) separation o f Q uebec
could do the trick. Deprived of
m ost of its French com ponent,
Canadians would be looking for
myth-makers, capable o f telling
them how different they are from
the Yankees.
S u m m in g U

p

In sum, with the exception of
Q uebec and the potential exception
o f the ROC (Rest o f C anada), the
hem isphere features virtually no
conditions am enable to the em er
gence or resurrection o f intellectu
als. D em ocratization an d obsoles
cence o f the idea o f nation as an
integrative entity, in addition to the
globalization of the economy, con
dem n the last nobility to convert its
m em bers into either professionals
(including professionals of politics,
or politicians) or gendelettres. If
m ore would-be intellectuals were
striving for liberty, equality, and the
pursuit of private happiness, and
no t for some gemeinschaft o f warriors
and producers, this would be an
unfortunate developm ent. ■
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Defanging the Predatory State
Robert M aguire

s Am ericans grapple
weapons through seizures and buy
with redefining the
back program s.
term s o f the “cove
It also includes the lawful separa
n a n t” between those
tion o f the police from the army,
who are governed,
the opening o f a professional police
Haitians are once
training academy, and the transfer
again struggling to forge theinfirst
duties in late M arch to the U.N.
such contract in their n a tio n ’s histo
Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti
ry. At its h eart the struggle pits a
(UNMIH) following MNF assurance
recidivistic, powerful and resilient
that H aiti’s overall environm ent is
few against the vast majority of
“safe and secure.” A 4,000-strong
Haitian citizens. T he few are resist
Interim Public Security Force
ing the dem ise o f their predatory
(IPSF), u n d er the supervision of
state, where econom ic and political
830 international police m onitors,
elites, with a supporting cast of mili
has also been created - though it
tary and param ilitary thugs, prey on
has n o t been warmly received by
the rest o f H aiti’s 7 million citizens
m ost Haitians since 3,000 o f its
for th eir own gratification. The
m em bers are form er m ilitary per
many are seeking to ensure the
sonnel “recycled” by way o f a oneem ergence o f m o d ern dem ocratic
week course on professional police
society, where elected leaders are
procedure and respect for hum an
accountable to citizens and eco
rights. The 1,000 o th er m em bers o f
nom ic predation falls victim to fair
the IPSF, refugees trained while in
com petition and rule o f law.
G uantanam o, have been m ore
Significant progress in defanging
warmly received by H aiti’s ordinary
H aiti’s predators has been m ade
citizens. T he first 375 m em bers of
since the S eptem ber 1994 “intervaH aiti's perm anent, professionallysion” o f Haiti by the U.S.-led m ulti
trained police were deployed follow
national force (MNF) and the sub
ing their graduation from the
sequent re tu rn o f governance by
police academ y in May. As they are
dem ocratically-elected leaders.
deployed, the p erm an en t police will
T hat progress includes the dep ar
replace the IPSF.
ture from Haiti o f the military
In spite o f widespread fears and
co u p ’s three leaders, the destruc
propaganda spread by coup leaders
tion o f the m ilitary’s coup-prone
betw een 1991 and 1994, precious
Heavy W eapons unit, the virtual
little violence or vengeance has
dem obilization of H aiti’s so-called
em anated from the heretofore
army, and the collection, by the end
repressed population since the
of January, of approxim ately 30,000
intervasion and the re tu rn of
President Jean-B ertrand Aristide.
O f special im portance to the U.S.,
all o f these accom plishm ents have
Robert Maguire is the Inter-American
also witnessed an en d to out-m igra
Foundation representative to Flaiti and
tion and the re tu rn o f many
a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins
refugees. In Haiti, the same events
University, where he coordinates the
have witnessed a reversal o f the
Hopkins-Georgetown Haiti Project.
internal displacem ent that accom 
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panied the coup and its subsequent
reign o f terro r against some
300,000 Haitians, many o f whom
make up community-based civil
society organizations th at will play a
crucial role in building a dem ocrat
ic future.
Im portant steps toward the evolu
tion o f a dem ocratic society have
occurred beyond the realm of
H aiti’s m ilitary and police. Am ong
them is President Aristide’s oftrepeated call for reconciliation, fol
lowed by tangible steps in that
direction. T he creation, in
D ecem ber 1994, o f a 24-m em ber
private/public sector Presidential
Commission for Econom ic Growth
and M odernization is one such
practical m easure toward that end.
Further, a legitim ate m inisterial gov
ernm ent, led by businessm an/
Prim e M inister Smark Michel, has
begun the unenviable jo b of
rebuilding the plu n d ered coun
try.
In late January, the A ristide/
Michel governm ent secured in ter
national pledges o f some $900 mil
lion over the following 12-15
m onths to support a reform -m inded social and econom ic reconstruc
tion plan. T he plan em phasizes cit
izen and local governm ent em pow
erm ent, trade, and dem ocratization
of the economy, including the sale
of state-owned enterprises. Finally,
progress, albeit slow, is being m ade
toward elections which will enable
Haitians to choose the parliam en
tarians, mayors, and town co u n 
selors who will becom e key players
in operationalizing and sustaining
H aiti’s first contract for dem ocratic
governance and accountability.
Even though all these develop
m ents have placed Haiti u n d e r a
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A contract for democratic governance in Haiti

glowing, silver cloud, it has a dark
lining. An incident featuring one
o f H aiti’s most notorious thugs ju x 
taposed the fragility o f progress
against the deeply rooted resistance
to a dem ocratic society and an end
to p redatory behavior.
An arm s and m aterials cache
uncovered by the MNF in Port-auPrince in early February has been
linked to Franck Romain, the for
mer, Duvalierist mayor o f that city,
also alleged to be one o f H aiti’s
forem ost param ilitary gang leaders.
For weeks following this incident,
Romain, who is im plicated in such
incidents as the Novem ber 1987
voter massacre and the Septem ber
1988 S t.Jo h n Bosco church
a rso n /m u rd er, rem ained at large,
reportedly holding n octurnal gang
m eetings similar to those that p re
ceded previous terrorist acts.
Despite the fact that he was sum
m oned to m eet high-ranking MNF
authorities, he was n o t detained.
Subsequently, he quietly slipped
into the Dom inican Republic.
R om ain’s case underscores several
broad concerns. O ne is that
despite the MNF’s arm s seizures
and buybacks, a m ultitude of
weapons, including scores o f semi
autom atics and h an d grenades dis
tributed between 1991 and 1994 by
m ilitary and param ilitary leaders,
still circulate. Given H aiti’s porous
b o rd er with the Dom inican
Republic, it would n o t be surprising
if the supply o f u n d erg ro u n d arms
in Haiti is not currently static.
R epeated requests by the
A ristide/M ichel governm ent for the
systematic disarm ing o f the popula
tion were declined by the MNF.
W hile targeted efforts to disarm
m ilitary and param ilitary thugs

increased somewhat between late
January and the MNF’s departure
on M arch 31 - the Rom ain cache is
a good exam ple - it is unlikely that
any systematic disarm am ent will
take place u n d e r the aegis of
UNMIH. Visiting W ashington in
late January, Prim e M inister Michel
expressed concern that with only
about 30 percen t of H aiti’s thugs
thus far disarm ed, the security of
electoral politics rem ains fragile.

The Haitian m ilitary’s
symbiotic relationship with
the country’s param ilitary
thugs is the ultimate issue
when it comes to defanging
the preda tors and sustaining
progress fa r beyond the
1996 departure of the U.N.
peacekeepers.
O f perhaps greater concern is the
fact that so many notorious charac
ters like Romain also rem ain in cir
culation in Haiti, basking in their
continued legal and judicial
impunity. To wit, when the MNF
tu rn ed over its detainees to the
H aitian governm ent in late January,
of the h u n dreds o f alleged crim i
nals and hum an rights abusers
either ro u n d ed up by the MNF or
tu rn ed over peacefully by citizens,
only 26 were tu rn ed over to Haitian
authorities. O thers had been
released by the MNF largely on the
grounds that there was no function
ing H aitian judicial system to followup on these cases, or that they had

“escaped” from prisons still u n d er
the control o f individuals affiliated
with the H aitian army. T he cu rren t
wave of m u rd er and organized
crim e is due, at least in part, to the
fact that suspected crim inals and
rights abusers have no t been
detained.
In addition to Franck Romain,
o th er notorious characters like
Em m anuel C onstant, the leader of
the violent vigilante group FRAPH,
have quietly slipped ou t of the
country. In a dismaying episode of
what was hopefully ju st bureaucratic
incom petence, C onstant is re p o rt
edly som ewhere in the U nited
States. O th er lesser-known recidi
vists have reportedly crossed the
b o rd e r to the Dom inican Republic,
to lurk there with their weapons
until they feel it advantageous to
return.
Some argue that since Septem ber
the backbone of the Haitian army
has been broken, and as a result,
individual thugs and the gangs they
once controlled have lost the
um brella protecting them . O thers
argue that the H aitian arm y never
h ad a single backbone to break.
Regardless, w ithout an en d to
impunity, destabilizing episodes of
political terro r and organized crim e
will continue, particularly with elec
tions on the horizon. Clearly, the
ultim ate solution o f this problem
calls for the existence o f an honest,
functioning judicial system and a
secure prison system that can com 
plem ent the efforts of a reform ed
police and a population seeking
rule o f law. U nfortunately, despite
significant H aitian and in tern atio n 
al attention to these m atters, this is
no t som ething that can be p u t
together overnight, particularly
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One
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since there has never been a func
tioning judicial system in Haiti that
has provided justice for all.
T he H aitian m ilitary’s symbiotic
relationship with the country's para
m ilitary thugs is the ultim ate issue
when it comes to defanging the
predators and sustaining progress
far beyond the 1996 d eparture of
the U.N. peacekeepers. Regardless
of the aforem entioned trends
toward dem ilitarization in Haiti,
internationally-supported social and
econom ic reconstruction plans
advanced by the H aitian govern
m en t still call for the reform ation
o f a 1,500-member arm ed force.
Surely, if a citizen referendum were
held in Haiti to d eterm ine w hether
or n o t the country needs a military,
practically all Haitians would vote
NO. Indeed, a public opinion poll
conducted in M arch u n d er the aus
pices o f the Arias Foundation for
Peace and H um an Progress found
62 p ercen t o f H aitians favored dis
banding the army entirely. How the
U.S. weighs in on this issue will ulti
mately be o f key im portance in
determ ining the future of an army
for Haiti. Presently, divergent views
on the m atter circulate within both
the W hite House and the Pentagon.
International presence thus far
has helped to create a safer and
m ore secure environm ent needed
by Haitians to advance their efforts
o f dem ocratic reform . The pred a
tors, though still lurking about, are
also very uncertain of their future.
As a result, optimism is growing
that if those trying to forge a con
tract for a dem ocratic society and
econom y are violently attacked
again, they will be able to w ithstand
the assault.
D uring the slow, tedious work of
consolidating reform s, H aiti’s lead
ers seeking to forge and sustain a
contract of accountable, dem ocratic
governance will need continued
in ternatio n al su p p o rt and decisive
m easures to ensure they rem ain out
o f the p red ato rs’ grasp. ■
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Reports: Paraguay

Old Back Water
Frank O. M ora

erhaps there is no o ther
country in the W estern
H em isphere where histo
ry repeats itself so often
as in Paraguay. Today,
m uch o f what continues
to tug at Paraguay’s fragile dem ocra
cy is the legacy o f its own political
culture. T he real challenge for
Paraguay is w hether it can overcome
its tu rb u len t and authoritarian past,
principally the Stroessner legacy,
before its rem nants snap and
destroy this young democracy.
Long relegated to the back-burner o f political and academ ic dis
course, Paraguay has been a victim
of geographic isolation and intellec
tual neglect. It has been plagued by
an irrational sense o f insecurity and
paranoia th at began before inde
p endence when the Jesuit missions
were established to protect the
G uarani Indians and the area from
the com bined wrath of the
Portuguese bandeirantes, the bar
barism o f the Chaco Indians, and
the im periousness of the portenos of
Buenos Aires. After independence,
the autocratic rule o f Jose Caspar
Rodriguez de Francia (1811-1840)
closed o ff any form o f participatory
politics and regulated contact with
the outside world, condem ning
Paraguayans to a childlike depen
dency on the state or “father” o f the
country and creating a provincial
ism th at tu rn ed it into a cultural

P
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international studies at Rhodes College,
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backwater. This was augm ented by
the devastating effects o f despotic
rule and a calam itous war (18651870) in which about half the popu
lation died.

Isolation has been the
official policy of many of
Paraguay’s authoritarian
dictatorships, starting
with Francia.
Political clientelism is both cause
and effect o f authoritarianism in
Paraguay. Personal relationships
have traditionally dom inated all
form s o f political activity, which has
retarded the developm ent o f dem o
cratic institutions in favor o f caudillism, personalism , and patronage.
This patron-client tradition has also
contributed to the expansion of cor
ruption, as a cause and conse
quence of the absence of effective
institutionalization. C orruption is
most clearly m anifest in the coun
try’s long experience with contra
band trade which, in addition to
lim iting the scope and role of insti
tutional politics, dem onstrates how
their isolation and fear of external
enem ies have induced a reliance on
illegal com m erce to survive.
The best portrayal o f Paraguayan
society and culture was written by
the award-winning novelist Augusto
Roa Bastos in two works, 1, Supreme
and Son of Man. Both novels pro
vide a vivid portrayal o f this brutal
and tender land whose people have
been subjected to tyranny, exploita
tion, violence and state-sponsored
corruption. This Paraguayan novel

ist movingly captures the plight of
many o f his people who, th rough
out history, have attem pted to resist
brutal repression. He shows the
humanity, pride, courage, and stub
bornness that enable the people of
Paraguay to go on living and fight
ing back while m ost o f the world
turns a blind eye to the brutality.
Roa Bastos suggests th at isolation
from external influences has been
the official policy o f m any of
Paraguay’s authoritarian dictator
ships, starting with the herm etic
regim e o f Francia and ending with
the paranoid kleptocracy o f G eneral
Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989).
These regim es hoped th at by insu
lating Paraguay from foreign influ
ences and attention they could
m aintain their iron grip over the
country w ithout risking the criticism
and ire o f the international com m u
nity.
The Stroessner regim e succeeded
in m aintaining a low profile which
helped limit international pressures
and criticisms. Additionally, as the
regim e suppressed all attem pts at
developing the social sciences in
Paraguay (this activity was consid
ered “subversive”), the academic
com m unity outside o f Paraguay fol
lowed suit, m aking the country the
least studied in the hem isphere.
The paucity o f social science
research on Paraguay illustrates this
fact. Paraguay is largely absent from
studies conducted and published in
the U.S. and Europe on such con
tem porary topics as dem ocratic
transition and political economy.
Even with Stroessner gone, it seems
that old habits are hard to over
come.
It is within this historical, socio
logical and international context
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Is there life after Stroessner?

that one m ust u n derstand the rule
and longevity o f the Stroessner
regime. Stroessner was the culm ina
tion o f a long history o f authoritari
anism and patrim onialism . He
clearly understood the history and
political culture o f the nation, and
he em phasized symbolic elem ents
and traditions th at rem inded the
population o f its authoritarian past.
His rule, however, cannot be solely
attributed to cultural elem ents - his
keen political skills coupled with the
“Stroessnerization” o f the state,
Colorado party, and arm ed forces
explains the longevity o f his regime.
Stroessner used the C olorado party
to solidify his power base by doling
out thousands of governm ent jobs
to its m em bers and controlling the
military by incorporating it into the
party.
In conjunction with repression,
co-optation, and m arginalization,
co rru p tio n played a pivotal role in
“greasing” the wheels o f this kleptocracy. C orruption, which
Stroessner believed to be the “price
for peace” in Paraguay, pervaded
every sector of Paraguayan society,
particularly the arm ed forces from
which he purchased and com pro
mised their absolute loyalty. High
ranking military and party officials
enjoyed lucrative sinecures in state
m onopolies, controlling m ajor com 
mercial fronts for narcotics, contra
band, and prostitution.
Stroessner and his cronies tu rn ed
Ciudad Presidente Stroessner (now
Ciudad del Este) and o th er towns
on the Brazilian b o rder into out
posts where all kinds o f illegal activi
ties were conducted - this region
becam e known as Paraguay’s “Far
East.” For this reason, Paraguay
received the well deserved reputa

tion during the late 1960s of being
the heart o f corruption and contra
band trade in South America. In
short, Stroessner exacerbated and
institutionalized all that had been
negative o f Paraguayan society and
political culture. Carlos M iranda
recently stated that the longevity of
the Stroessner regim e could be
“found in the fabric o f Paraguayan
society and in the way he tailored
his role to that society.”

In the end, the coup of
1989 left intact Stroessner’s
structure of corruption.
There was no fea r of a
military coup while one
of their own governed.
A lthough Stroessner was over
thrown in February 1989, the transi
tion and the governm ent’s interna
tional image continue to be ham 
pered by the legacy o f his reign.
W hen G eneral Andres Rodriguez
staged the coup that overthrew his
political m entor, it was no t a com 
plete break with the past. In fact,
many o f the same faces and institu
tions rem ained even though
Rodriguez and the new governm ent
liberalized all forms o f political
activity. T he dem ocratic process
rem ained incom plete because
im portant enclaves or authoritarian
rem nants im peded the process at
different levels and dimensions.
The ruling C olorado party, though
significantly fragm ented, rem ained
a dom inant force, and the military
continued to hold on to its privi

leged position in Paraguayan poli
tics and economics. In the end, the
coup o f 1989 left intact Stroessner’s
structure o f corruption. T here was
no fear o f a military coup while one
of their own, G eneral Rodriguez
(1989-1993), governed and super
vised a restricted “transition from
above.”
The foundation o f Paraguay’s
fragile dem ocracy began to shake in
1992, when the arm ed forces
refused to allow its power and influ
ence to be dim inished by a new con
stitution or by a military organic law
proposed by opposition parties. In
the events leading up to the May
1993 general elections, the military
m ade it clear that no m atter the
results the arm ed forces would “cogovern Paraguay for centuries u nto
centuries.” T he threat to
Paraguayan dem ocracy is personi
fied and em bodied in a populist
general nam ed Lino Oviedo, com 
m ander o f the arm ed forces.
Ju an Carlos Wasmosy, a civil engi
n eer and candidate of the ruling
Colorado party, won the May 1993
presidential election with 40 p er
cent o f the vote, m aking him the
first civilian president chosen in
free, competitive and direct elec
tions since Paraguay’s in d ep en 
dence. His election has allowed
Paraguay to finally discard its isola
tionism, a process started by
Rodriguez, and cease being “an
island surrounded by lan d ,” as many
Paraguayans describe their land
locked country. T he press is largely
free, the opposition is tolerated and
active, and hum an rights are
respected, but the shadow o f the
military, institutional corruption,
and poverty still linger, posing seri
ous threats to democracy.
Hemisphere
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P resident Wasmosy has n o t been
able to assert civilian authority over
the military. H e has n o t confront
ed the m ilitary or cut back the
endem ic co rru p tio n and sm uggling
traditionally pro tected by the
arm ed forces. G eneral Oviedo has
kept up his bad boy rhetoric, o p en 
ly defying the p resident and
Congress after they passed a law
last year p ro h ibiting m ilitary p er
sonnel from m aking political state
m ents. In a speech before
Paraguayan farm ers, Oviedo said,
“We d o n ’t know if the m an is b o rn
who can sew up the m ouths o f the
m ilitary.” W hile Oviedo has jailed
th ree generals for calling him
“schizophrenic” an d “p aran o id ,” he
him self did n o t receive even a rep 
rim and.
Tensions m o u n ted an d rum ors of
a coup spread d uring the second
h alf o f 1994. G eneral Ram on Rosa
Rodriguez, d irector o f the anti-nar
cotics secretariat, was assassinated,
allegedly by a fellow officer. This
b ro u g h t to light the power o f the
d ru g m afia in Paraguay, believed to
be linked to the Cali C artel and
pro tected by the arm ed forces.
Paraguay has becom e an im portant
transit p o in t for Bolivian cocaine
destined to th e U.S. and Europe.
A ccording to U.S. officials,
one-and-a-half tons o f cocaine
moves th ro u g h Paraguay every
week.
T he opposition dem anded that
Wasmosy do m ore to weaken the
arm ed forces which, it contended,
were tu rn in g Paraguay into a narco
democracy. Wasmosy did very lit
tle. T hen, in D ecem ber civil-mili
tary tensions reached a new high,
provoking m ore rum ors o f a coup
and presidential assassination.
Wasmosy d enied O viedo’s request
to transfer a general widely viewed
as his ch ief rival. Eventually, the
presid en t and Oviedo reached a
com prom ise, b u t the opposition
took this o pportunity to criticize
the p resident for n o t curbing the
20 Hemisphere
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power o f a c o rru p t an d undisci
p lined arm ed forces headed by a
renegade general.
Some observers believe Wasmosy
is beh o ld en to Oviedo because the
general help ed him gain the party
nom ination; o th er intim ate that
Oviedo has dam aging inform ation
on the president and is threatening
to use it during a time o f extrem e
public sensitivity to co rru p tio n
am ong public officials. W hat is
clear is that President Wasmosy suf
fers from a certain paralysis because to govern he m ust m ain
tain political alliances with interest
groups whose political agendas are
in conflict. In the end, Paraguay’s
dem ocracy will d ep en d u p o n how
well Wasmosy can reconcile the
co u n try ’s anti-dem ocratic legacy
with popular dem ands for dem oc
racy an d accountability.
T he political history o f Paraguay
is predom inantly authoritarian in

culture and practice. W hether mili
tary o r civilian, Paraguayan govern
m ents have been autocratic. The
legacy and experience o f the past
does counsel a certain caution
regarding the short-term m alleabili
ty o f long-standing sociocultural
values an d political arrangem ents
th at continue to persist. It is not
m ere inertia. R ecent developm ents
in Paraguay dem onstrate th at the
past keeps com ing back in the form
o f exclusionary, clientelistic in tra
party politics which encourage and
perpetuate m ilitarism and co rru p 
tion. T he centrality o f the arm ed
forces an d the lack o f cohesion
am ong socioeconom ic classes and
political organizations make
dem ocracy in Paraguay reversible.
In short, as Paraguayan jo u rn alist
and political analyst Esteban
Caballero so astutely stated, “It is
h ard er to deal with the past when
the past is still living with you.” ■
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The Measure of Reform
Bruce Kelley

eoliberal reform pro
u n d er P inochet and P eru u n d er
grams in Latin
Fujimori are two examples.
America are designed
Elsewhere, governm ents have been
to increase the role
able to im plem ent these reform s if
of m arkets in allocat
they dom inate the political process,
ing resources with
as in Mexico, or if they are the tradi
the aim o f increasing investmtional
ent representative o f populism,
and econom ic efficiency. In gener
such as M enem in Argentina.
al, m icroeconom ic changes are
Domestic political factors will con
directed toward im proving efficien
tinue to play an im portant role in
cy. Tariff reductions lower domestic
shaping econom ic policy in 1995.
prices o f im ported goods, forcing
Both A rgentina and P eru had presi
dom estic producers to operate
dential elections with incum bents
m ore efficiently and cut production
who used econom ic policy to help
costs. In a similar vein, legal or
win re-election. New governm ents
institutional reform s that reduce
elected last year in Mexico, Brazil
regulation o f the labor m arket give
and Venezuela m ust prove they can
firms m ore flexibility in production
m anage their econom ies as well as
and lower wage rates.
govern their countries. T he task is
M acroeconom ic changes, such as
even m ore difficult where govern
smaller governm ent deficits, prim ar
m ents m ust consolidate the institu
ily affect investm ent and growth
tions o f civilian rule.
through greater price stability and
lower interest rates. As with lower
C a p it a l G l o b a l iz a t i o n
wages, deficit reduction has distribu
Growing problem s with in tern a
tional consequences as higher taxes
tional financial m arkets will also
and governm ent cutbacks are not
present challenges for the region.
b o rn e equally. An additional ten
Prom pted by the collapse o f the
sion within neoliberal reform pro
Mexican peso, capital flows to the
grams is that they impose im m edi
region will fall sharply, resulting in
ate costs while their benefits are
several im m ediate effects. First,
uncertain and take time to occur.
countries will be forced to m oderate
A reduced state role and distribu
their appetite for im ports, which
tional consequences o f reform pro
will reduce growth. Trade liberaliza
grams en g en d er significant dom es
tion and boom ing investm ent tied
tic opposition. In some countries,
to econom ic restructuring pro
like Brazil, political opposition has
duced a surge in imports;
prevented significant reform s, while
Venezuelan im ports nearly doubled
in Venezuela it caused the reform
between 1990 and 1992, while
program to collapse. Success has
A rgentina’s im ports are two-andoften com e in countries lacking for
one-half times higher than three
mal political opposition; Chile
years ago. Future growth, however,
will be m uch m ore m oderate. A
sharp change in capital flows also
Bruce Kelley is assistant professor of
has the potential to destabilize the
economics at Florida International
whole financial system and could
University.
spark widespread bank failures in
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countries like Mexico and
A rgentina. T he governm ent
response o f hiking interest rates to
slow the econom y and defend the
exchange rate m ight improve the
external situation, bu t it depresses
asset values and underm ines the bal
ance sheet o f the banking system.
The collapse o f Venezuela’s banking
system in 1994, although caused by
different factors, indicates the longlasting im pact o f a financial crisis.
Financial instability will also slow
privatization in many countries that
still have publicly owned enterpris
es. A lthough privatization has
served to elim inate a m ajor source
o f the public sector deficit, coun
tries will no longer have the easy
access to the foreign funds that
these sales generated.
B r a z il

Despite the trem endous decline
in inflation, price stability remains
the key to Brazil’s econom ic out
look. Plan Real has cut m onthly
inflation from 50 p ercen t in Ju n e to
below 2 percent, helping its design
er, F ernando H enrique Cardoso, get
elected president in November, but
the country still faces trem endous
problem s. Inflation rem ains high,
the currency has becom e severely
overvalued, the trade balance has
fallen into deficit in recen t m onths
and the governm ent has yet to
attack the econom y’s structural
problem s. While m ovem ent on
these fronts is possible, there are
several reasons to believe things will
no t improve m uch in 1995.
First, inflation is unlikely to fall
m uch m ore since the past decline
partly reflects a fall in inertial infla
tion following the introduction of a
new index (URV) and a change in
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The varying costs of economic reforms

the indexation process. Further
m ore, the URV is heavily influenced
by the exchange rate so the real’s
appreciation during the last six
m onths has helped lower inflation.
T he real’s cu rren t overvaluation,
however, suggests any adjustm ent
will produce higher inflation. Most
im portantly, the cu rren t rebound in
econom ic activity reduces the likeli
hood o f lower inflation unless
Congress passes significant econom 
ic reform s. This is unlikely to hap
pen given Brazil’s political situation.
A lthough F ernando C ardoso’s
election in the first ro u n d of ballot
ing last O ctober seem ed to indicate
su p p o rt for his econom ic reform
program , his them es o f fiscal
responsibility and privatization did
no t carry over to Congress, where
his party rem ains a small minority.
T he fragm ented n ature of the
Brazilian Congress, com bined with
the im portance o f pressure groups
and regional interests, makes it very
difficult to build a stable coalition to
enact these reform s. Thus, any
wholesale change in the fiscal sys
tem, the core issue facing Brazil, is
no t likely this year. At best, there
will be some sales o f public enter
prises, b u t these will be lim ited by
public opposition and the concerns
o f investors about Brazil’s econom ic
future.
T he im m ediate picture is clouded
by the overvalued exchange rate,
which along with tariff reductions
have led to a flood o f imports.
Im ports in 1994 rose an estim ated
$12 billion and the trade balance
tu rn ed negative in November. The
m ore inclusive cu rren t account
recorded a $5.4 billion deficit which
m ust be financed. Last year, capital
inflows were m ore than sufficient to
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cover this gap and international
reserves reached $40 billion. In the
wake o f the Mexican crisis, however,
such flows have been reduced and
reserves have begun falling. Thus,
at this ju n ctu re exchange rate policy
is critical. T he governm ent’s prob
lem is how to alter the exchange
rate w ithout reigniting domestic
inflation and underm ining public
confidence. While an overvalued
exchange rate can help win elec
tions, the Mexican situation has
rem inded everyone that the capital
inflows underlying such a policy can
be quickly reversed when wealth
holders anticipate a future devalua
tion. Unfortunately, Brazil is not
the only country in such a dilemma.

A r g e n t in a

A rgentina also faces a crucial deci
sion regarding exchange policy,
although the econom ic and political
pictures are m uch different than
Brazil. Over the last four years,
President Carlos M enem and Econ
omy Minister Domingo Cavallo have
ended hyperinflation, elim inated the
public sector deficit, pushed through
constitutional reform and sold virtu
ally all state-owned enterprises. The
results have been impressive; eco
nom ic growth has averaged 7 per
cent over the past four years with
inflation falling to 3.9 percent in
1994. A fixed exchange rate which
controls the m oney supply has been
a key com ponent in this rebound.
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One
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T he problem is th at in 1994
A rgentina recorded an estim ated
trade deficit o f $5.8 billion and cur
re n t account deficit o f $10 billion,
the latter representing 6.5 percent
o f GDP. Observers have com pared
A rgentina to Mexico o f last year;
while the parallel is no t exact,
(A rgentina’s inflation has been in
line with global inflation the last two
years), the similarity has spooked
investors, reversing capital flows and
causing the dom estic stock m arket
to plum m et. The governm ent has
four options: do n o thing and watch
the external situation deteriorate
further; cut expenditures and raise
taxes to slow econom ic growth; hike
dom estic interest rates to reduce
o u tp u t and attract capital; or deval
ue in the hope o f im proving the
trade balance.
Cavallo has repeatedly refused to
devalue due to the im portance of
the exchange rate in anchoring
dom estic prices and to avoid the
turm oil caused by M exico’s devalua
tion. Restrictive fiscal policy is also
unlikely given the election year and
the fact that while the governm ent
deficit is rising, it is only 1 percent
o f GDP. Thus, financial m easures
appear to be the governm ent’s only
option. R ecent m easures seek to
improve the external im balance by
fu rth er dollarizing the financial sys
tem and increasing interest rates,
causing growth to d rop from an esti
m ated 7.5 p ercen t in 1994 to 3.2
p ercen t this year. Since the govern
m ent has tied m onetary policy to
the level o f reserves, capital outflows
have sparked a liquidity crisis in the
banking system which could spread
to a m ore serious financial crisis if
the governm ent does no t alter its
tack.
These econom ic problem s and
lingering resentm ent over the
inequity o f the reform process did
not prevent M enem ’s re-election,
b u t A rgentina will see slower growth
and higher inflation in 1995.
M onthly inflation has surged to
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almost 1 percent during the past
few m onths com pared to average
increases o f 0.2 percent over the
previous year. The governm ent
deficit is rising, and although
M enem cut expenditures across the
board in late 1994, the structural
problem s still exist and will no t be
addressed given this year’s electoral
pressures. Since price stability
underlies m uch of A rgentina’s cur
re n t success, higher inflation in
1995 - 4.7 percent com pared to 3.9
percent in 1994 - could jeopardize
the econom ic picture.
V enezuela

Venezuela’s experience highlights
how quickly the reform process can
collapse. After surging 9.7 percent
in 1991, o utput fell an estim ated 1
percen t in 1993 and 3.3 percent in
1994 am id a massive banking fail
ure, weak political leadership and
uncertainty surrounding econom ic
policy. At the same time inflation

has shot up, topping 60 p ercen t in
1994 with no signs o f abating. With
a weak president facing a divided
Congress, the political situation is
no t helping m atters and the bleak
outlook has completely tu rn ed off
foreign investors.
T he Venezuelan crisis also illus
trates the fact that u n d er dem ocrat
ic rule, econom ic reform s need to
be politically palatable as well as
economically consistent. After the
initial reform package was im ple
m ented in 1989, riots broke out,
leaving 300 dead. While the econo
my boom ed in 1991 and 1992, living
standards for the poor did not
improve, and two military revolts in
1992 found popular backing.
W eakened by these coup attem pts,
public protests and electoral failure
in the m idterm elections, Carlos
Andres Perez resigned in 1993 amid
charges o f corruption. Elections to
replace him in D ecem ber 1993 con
firm ed the public’s opposition to

Special Report: South America

econom ic reforms; Rafael Caldera
was elected on his promises to halt
the privatization process and reverse
standing econom ic policy.
So far, C aldera’s tenure in office
has worsened the econom ic crisis.
The banking crisis and financial
panic in 1994 have perm anently
altered investor sentim ent and eco
nom ic stability. This, coupled with
C aldera’s nationalist rhetoric and
inability to form ulate a coherent
econom ic policy, has caused private
investm ent to evaporate. At the
same time, distributional pressures
have kept inflation above 60 per
cent. Price and exchange controls
can stabilize the situation in the
short-run, but without fiscal reforms
and reduced social tensions, sustain
able m edium -term growth will not
appear. The banking crisis will also
continue to depress output as the
financial system remains extremely
fragile. For 1995, the growing trade
and cu rren t account surplus reflect
ongoing problem s in the domestic
economy rath er than the external
sector’s strength.
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C h il e

With the sm ooth transition to a
new president, Eduardo Frei, and
continued sensible m acroeconom ic
m anagem ent, Chile appears to have
consolidated the economic and
political reform s o f the past. While
tensions between the civilian govern
m ent and the military continue, they
are unlikely to derail the current
expansion. The governm ent’s tar
gets of average growth of 5.5 percent
through the end of the decade and
5 p ercent inflation in 1999 are opti
mistic, but achievable. Reforms such
as privatization o f the pension sys
tem have sparked savings and invest
m ent, while the emphasis on infra
structure developm ent will improve
productivity and the competitiveness
of Chile’s exports, the key to the
country’s econom ic success.
O n the o th er side, the govern
m ent m ust indicate it is m ore sensi-
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tive to social issues and the poor
than have previous adm inistrations.
While aggregate o u tp u t has nearly
doubled over the last dozen years,
30 p ercent of the population contin
ues to live in poverty; m ore atten
tion m ust be given to how the eco
nom ic pie is distributed. T he previ
ous adm inistration was able to side
step this issue given the difficulties
o f a transition to civilian rule, but
the new governm ent cannot.
Increasingly, support for a particu
lar civilian governm ent will be based
on its ability to solve these problem s
rath er than as an option to military
rule. Candidate Frei indicated that
social spending in health and ed u 
cation would increase, but President
Frei has n o t carried through on
these promises, and recent strikes
indicate growing restlessness on the
p art o f workers.
These factors suggest that
increased growth in 1995 will likely
preclude any fu rth er reduction in
inflation. As tight m onetary policy,

'Americas
Net

which reduced inflation from 22
p ercent in 1991 to 11.4 percent last
year, is loosened, investm ent and
growth should pick up from an esti
m ated 4.2 percent in 1994 to 5.3
p ercent this year. The govern
m en t’s ability to ru n a m ore expan
sionary policy, despite the risk of
higher inflation, reflects last year’s
decision to sacrifice growth in
retu rn for price stability. This m odi
fied fears in the business com m uni
ty that civilian rule would result in a
retu rn to the short-run, populist
policies of the past.
Fu tu re T

rends

Latin Am erica’s econom ic
rebound of the last four years will
slow significantly in 1995 as the
region finds it increasingly difficult
to attract the external capital which
has funded the recent growth.
While international capital markets
have reduced their enthusiasm for
em erging m arkets in general, specif
ic factors in many countries also

work against continued growth.
External im balances in A rgentina
and Brazil require some change in
econom ic policy, while banking fail
ures in Venezuela have wiped out a
large part of the country’s financial
capital. Only in Chile is the com bi
nation o f solid growth and reason
able price stability forecast with a
high degree o f confidence.
Thus, 1995 will likely witness
sharply differing econom ic perfo r
m ances across South America as
countries have varying degrees of
success in addressing their specific
com bination of econom ic imbal
ances, social tensions and political
uncertainty. While a retu rn to the
hyperinflation and stagnation o f the
1980s is unlikely, the prom ises of
sustained growth with price stability
m ade by neoliberal reform ers will
rem ain elusive. Instead the region
will exhibit great prom ise, b u t also
great volatility, as countries grope
with developing and applying their
own set o f consistent reform s. ■

The Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University, in
cooperation with Tandem Computer Corporation, presents AmericasNet, an
Internet site that serves as the centralized source of information on progress
toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
On AmericasNet you w ill find:
• A complete repository of documents from the 1994 Summit of the Americas
• Overviews of current hemispheric trade agreements
• Detailed economic analyses on the countries and sub-regions of the Americas
Coming soon:

• Full text and analysis of CBI, ATPAand other trade agreements in the Americas
• Status of negotiations regarding Chile's accession to NAFTA

To connect to AmericasNet, point your W orld-Wide-Web browser to http://americas.fiu.edu. For more information,
you can e-mail webmaster@americas.fiu.edu or call Rene Ramos at (305) 348-2894/Fax (305) 348-3593.
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Andean Cicciolina
Susana Diaz, a form er cabaret
dancer also known as “la Cicciolina
C hola,” won a seat in the Peruvian
Congress during the April general
elections. Diaz, who cam paigned
by displaying h er ballot num ber
(13) on h er d erriere, has b een fac
ing some difficulties in h er new job.
In late May she was charged with
associating with “el Vaticano,”
P e ru ’s m ost notorious drug lord
who was arrested in 1994.
Apparently, Diaz was one o f many
p erform ers h ired to entertain traf
fickers du rin g th eir hours o f bore
dom in the Huallaga Valley.

New Cuba Man
R ichard Nuccio, deputy undersecre
tary o f state for Latin Am erican
Affairs, has been nam ed President
C lin to n ’s special adviser on C uban
Affairs. N uccio’s views on C uba are
well liked in M iam i’s exile com m u
nity, which viewed the appointm ent
as an attem p t to tem per the adm in
istration’s new policy o f repatriating
Cubans fleeing the island.

New Report Out
In Jan u ary 1995, the InterAm erican D evelopm ent Bank and
the Econom ic Commission for
Latin Am erica issued “Trade
Liberalization in the W estern
H em isphere.” T he re p o rt sum m a
rizes the findings o f governm ent
officials, en trep ren eu rs and acade
mics on three issues: what m ight be

Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra
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achieved from hem ispheric trade
liberalization; essential conditions
to maximize gains; and how to go
about liberalizing trade. T he pro
je c t concluded th at trade liberaliza
tion by itself is a necessary bu t no t
sufficient condition o f the develop
m ent process; that countries
require access to b etter trade data
in o rd e r to proceed with hem i
spheric liberalization; an d that lib
eralization warrants caution.
Copies o f the re p o rt can be
obtained from the IDB or ECLAC.

Miami Bound
Over the last year, Miami, San Juan,
Tam pa and several o th er cities com 
p eted to attract the U nited States
S outhern C om m and, the U.S. mili
tary’s headquarters for operations
in C entral and South America. In
M arch, the Pentagon announced
that SOUTHCOM would move to
Miami in 1999. Miami expects to
gain about 750 jobs and increased
com m erce as a result o f the move.

Florida’s Summit Fever
In Ju n e 1995, Florida G overnor
Lawton Chiles signed a budget bill
authorizing the establishm ent of
the Sum m it of the Americas Center.
L aunched in August 1995, the
C enter will m onitor progress on the
accords signed by the Sum m it par
ticipants in D ecem ber o f 1994.
H oused at Florida International
University’s Latin Am erican and
C aribbean Center, the C enter is a
cooperative venture am ong FIU,
the University o f F lorida’s C enter
for Latin A m erican Studies, and the
University o f M iam i’s North-South
Center.

Beauty and the Beast
D uring a recen t visit to London,
A rgentine Foreign M inister Guido
di Telia was quoted com plaining
about the im m igration woes o f his
country. At cu rren t growth rates,
between 25 and 30 p ercen t of
A rgentina’s population could be of
Bolivian or Paraguayan origin by
the year 2000. Di Telia told the
British audience th at his country
wants to be close to the “beautiful
p eo p le.” A rgentina, like the U.S.
and several E uropean countries, is
facing an anti-im m igrant fervor
am ong its population th at could
possibly translate into governm ent
policy.

The Hand o f God
Soundly defeated 3-0 by the U.S.,
the A rgentine soccer team had
som ething to prove in its final game
at the Copa Am erica played in
U ruguay last July. A rgentina scored
early and led for m ost o f the ball
gam e against world cham pion
Brazil. T hen, in the last few m in
utes, Brazil’s Tulio dow ned the ball
with his hand and scored, tying the
score and sending the gam e into
an overtim e penalty shortout. Ar
gentina lost in penalty kicks and
was elim inated from the com peti
tion; calls w ent out for the head of
the referee who had failed to call
the han d ball. T he irony was not
lost on Brazilians, who invoked
M aradona’s “h an d o f G od” goal
against G reat Britain in the 1986
World Cup. M aradona, however,
was incensed by the com parison,
calling Tulio’s effort “the devil’s
h a n d .”

F

111 Will Ambassador
Brazilian President F ernando
H enrique C ardoso’s scheduled July
visit to Portugal m et with some
unusual problem s. T he Brazilian
am bassador to Lisbon is C ardoso’s
predecessor, Itam ar Franco. O n July
18, 1995, R euters re p o rted state
m ents by the am bassador that
C ardoso’s policies would dam age
the econom y an d h u rt salaried
workers. Franco went on to warn
th at high interest rates would trig
ger a recession an d that were it no t
for his help, Cardoso would never
have becom e president. Cardoso
resp o n d ed th at “in the future all
fo rm er presidents should be nam ed
am bassadors to Lisbon.”

Fidel Castro On-Line
N et heads have p ro duced a series of
innovative, unusual, and often
hum orous new sites on the World
Wide Web. O ne o f the m ost recent
to surface is the “Fidel for
P resid en t” page. Any surfer can tap
in to a ph o to gallery o f Fidel, o rd er
t-shirts and bu m p er stickers, read
about vice-presidential possibilities,
and write to com plain or com m ent.
To reach the Fidel hom e page
th ro u g h the W orld W ide Web type
http://w w w .slugs.com /im agesm ith/fidel.

Transparent Time
Transparency In tern atio n al’s M arch
new sletter reports that Colom bian
President E rnesto Sam per launched
a m ajor anti-corruption cam paign
to restore public confidence in that
co u n try ’s public sector. T he plan
calls for the establishm ent o f a

E

L

“transparency office” in each
agency to interact with the public,
and a “transparent m in u te” on
radio and television to provide
updates on the progress o f the
plan.

Matters, has accepted a position as
vice president o f Intern atio n al
Public Relations with AT&T. Arcos
will work out o f AT&T’s Latin
Am erican headquarters in Coral
Gables, Florida.

Exporting Pension Plans

Requiem for the Left

A ccording to an item in the May 4
issue o f the Latin American Weekly
Report, the Chilean pension fund
adm inistrator signed agreem ents in
principle with the governm ents of
Bolivia and El Salvador to begin
operations in those countries when
private pension schemes are intro
duced there. Provida is one of the
best known private pension
investors in Latin America, having
invested in A rgentina, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru. T he move is
an o th er step toward the dism an
tling o f publicly-funded pension
plans th ro u g h o u t the region.

In May, some 250 Latin A m erican
leftists regrouped in M ontevideo,
U ruguay to protest the em bargo
against Cuba, to call for a renegoti
ation o f the reg io n ’s foreign debt,
respect for hum an rights, an d for
social justice. According to press
accounts o f the m eeting, the partic
ipants spent m ost o f the time p u rg 
ing those leftist parties who have
em braced m arket reform s and very
little time on how to reverse the
organized left’s electoral irrele
vance in the cu rren t neoliberal
trend. R em arked a young
U ruguayan, “It’s no good clinging
to old symbols. If we d o n ’t wake
up, the left will be swallowed by the
right.”

Blinders in Bolivia
A ccording to Americas Watch, an
official with the DEA adm itted that
to avoid direct knowledge o f abuses
by Bolivian police, DEA agents
“wear blinders when conducting
jo in t operations.” O ne agent was
quoted as saying, “we are guests in
their country. It’s no t for us to crit
icize...we fuel the truck and say, ‘go
get 'e m .’ If people com e back
arrested with bruises on their face,
it’s not my responsibility.”

AT&T Reaches Out
Cresencio Arcos, form er am bas
sador to H onduras and until May,
deputy assistant secretary o f state
for Narcotics and Terrorism

Ideology o f Terror
Amnesty In tern atio n al’s annual
re p o rt claims 4,000 political prison
ers in Peruvian jails; the majority
are m em bers o f the Shining Path.
According to Luis Gonzales, an AI
officer in Peru, “crim es by terro r
ists, even w hen they are o f a crim i
nal nature, are considered political
because they have a political m oti
vation.” Fujim ori responded, “some
believe that when a terrorist says he
has an ideology, he should no
longer be considered a terro rist.”
Most Peruvian hum an rights organi
zations reject A I’s conclusions as
well.
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One
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The Money Store
Jeremy Adelman

his essay puts the tur
Mexican peso and its fallout is his
moil of Latin American
torically unique. Com parisons with
financial m arkets into a
previous crises help illustrate the
recen t historical per
m ultiple personalities o f finance
spective. It has two
capital and the challenges public
interrelated argum ents:
authorities will face in trying to
first, the reactions to the debt avert
crisis a full-scale global financial cri
o f 1982 spawned a set o f policies
sis. As Walter Bagehot w arned in
designed to revamp Latin American
his classic Jeremiad on the eve o f the
econom ies w ithout elim inating the
first great depression in 1875, finan
underlying d ep endence on world
cial crises can rock the balance
m oney markets; second, recent
between the pursuit o f private self(post-1990) capital flows and the
interest and the effectiveness of
eu p h o ria o f “em erging m arkets”
public regulation.
obscured the highly contingent and
volatile nature of transborder invest
m ent.
Financial crises can rock the
These two argum ents are related.
T he policies to cope with financial
balance between the pursuit
upheaval o f the 1980s generated
of private self-interest and
o pportunities for new, highly specu
lative investm ent in Latin America.
the effectiveness of public
This dovetailed with slum ping yields
regulation.
on financial investments in core
m oney m arkets and a slowdown in
general econom ic perform ance,
which released m obile capital to
1982 i n R e t r o s p e c t
pursue higher earnings abroad. In
In August 1982, when Mexican
large m easure, the recent malaise in
Finance M inister Jesus Silva Herzog
Mexico can be attributed to the
annou nced M exico’s inability to
com bination o f a closure in specula
m eet future d ebt payments, a fivetive financial deals and the repatria
year boom in lending to Latin
tion o f capital to core markets as
America came to a sharp and cata
econom ic growth has recovered and
clysmic end. Several aspects o f for
interest rates rise.
eign borrow ing deserve m ention.
We are not, however, witnesses to
First, m uch o f the m oney was
the reenactm ent of the previous
used th roughout the region (with
d eb t crisis. T he m eltdown o f the
the arguable exception o f Brazil) to
correct underlying deficits on trade
accounts. In the late 1970s,
Jeremy Adelman is assistant professor of
A rgentina, Chile, Mexico and
history at Princeton University. He is the
Venezuela used foreign exchange
author of F rontier Development:
rates as blunt instrum ents to tackle
Land, Labour and Capital on the
dom estic inflation. Over the m edi
W heatlands o f A rgentina and
um -term , local currencies soon
Canada, 1890-1914 (Oxford University
becam e overvalued, drawing greater
Press, 1994).
im ports and inhibiting exports. In
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some countries, such as A rgentina
and Chile, military regimes
em barked on a reckless cam paign to
deregulate local financial sectors,
enabling billowing local banks to act
as interm ediaries for the deluge of
foreign funds. T he accum ulation of
external debt responded to dom es
tic policies designed to stabilize and
“liberalize” Latin Am erican
economies.
Second, capital flowed almost
exclusively through the sinews of
com m ercial banks, based mainly in
the U nited States. Until the late
1950s, com m ercial banks played a
residual role in dispensing global
capital, and m uch o f the non-equity
flows moved through official chan
nels (such as the W orld Bank and
the Inter-American D evelopm ent
Bank). In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the collapse o f the Bretton
Woods system, com bined with inno
vations in international bank lend
ing practices (primarily the inven
tion o f the syndicated loan), loos
ened banks from their national
m oorings and converted them into
potential channels for investible
funds. Thus, when world oil prices
began to soar in the 1970s, OPEC
surpluses were recirculated into off
shore banks who found themselves
with a surfeit o f capital to lend. In
the context of a generalized crisis in
the OECD (O rganization for
Econom ic C ooperation and
D evelopm ent), lending to develop
ing countries becam e increasingly
attractive.
These pull and push factors in
global capital m arkets triggered
u npreced en ted flows from money
centers to Latin America. Policy
changes, especially in the rules gov
erning local financial affairs, eased

u
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Whatever happened to the debt crisis?

the access to local markets, while
large quasi-oligopolistic com m ercial
banks served as the m ain agent for
capital flows to the region. W hen
the crisis h it in 1982, m ost
econom ies reacted by reversing ear
lier liberalization measures. In
turn, Latin Am erican countries
lined up to renegotiate their debts
to banks, and for the first five years
of the adjustm ent phase foreign
endebtedness actually rose as banks
rolled over previous obligations. A
crucial actor in this com plicated
brokerage was the International
M onetary Fund (IMF), which sud
denly d o n n ed u n p recedented insti
tutional strength as m ediator and
len d er o f last resort. In this fashion,
a com bination o f policy flexibility,
bank rollovers and strategic interna
tional institutional intervention
avoided full-scale default.
C om pared to previous financial
crises in Latin America, such as the
1820s, the 1890s or the 1930s, m an
agem ent in the 1980s averted finan
cial collapse. T he institutional
structure o f 1970s lending m ade
com m ercial banks the final holders
o f m ost o f the sem i-periphery’s
debt. Moreover, banks’ syndicated
lending practices allowed them to
stand as a com m on front - in con
trast to the atom ized and disorga
nized profile of bondholders in ear
lier financial cycles. In previous
crises, sovereign borrowers could
m ore easily default or force lenders
to accept m ore generous term s to
reschedule debts since m ost
investors did n o t have the institu
tional clout o f m oney-center banks.
Together, these institutional
changes shifted the bargaining
power between len d er and borrow 
er dramatically in favor o f the for

mer. This power enabled banks to
divert substantial resources out of
the periphery to the core.
Paradoxically, while old debts were
rolled over and interest arrears fold
ed into the accum ulated principal,
Latin America en d u red sustained
net outflows o f resources (debt-service charges over new earnings of
foreign exchange) for the rest of
the 1980s.

The very heterogeneity
of money managers and
skittishness of petty
investors inhibits any
cooperation.

T h e Se c o n d A d ju s t m e n t

T he first phase o f adjustm ent
soon ran afoul. The initial response
to the crisis sought to protect the
stability o f the world financial sys
tem at the expense o f debtors. By
1987, however, debtors had suffered
five years o f financial com pression
and clearly displayed signs o f debt
fatigue: m ounting social tension,
careening inflation and widening
budget deficits, the latter two aggra
vated and n o t am eliorated by IMF
stabilization.
Latin America faced a second
ro u n d of adjustm ent. Sponsored by
the U nited States Treasury
D epartm ent, an alternative system
o f debt restructuring sought to
reduce the overall weight of out
standing debt. International institu
tions as well as U.S. Treasury bonds
were used to support debt buyback
(whereby C entral Banks would p u r

chase the debt from creditors at
some discount) and conversion
from bank debt to longer-term p o rt
folio debt (the so-called Brady
Bonds). B eginning in 1987 with
Chile, but m ore generalized u n d er
the um brella of the “Brady P lan” in
1989, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa
Rica, U ruguay and A rgentina began
offering debt and debt service
reduction options. By 1993, some
$116 billion had been altered from
short-term to longer-term debt or
changed to dom estic obligations
through buyback provisions.
This second phase of debt adjust
m ent had its dom estic corollary. In
chronically high inflation countries
like A rgentina and Brazil, inflation
was attacked with dram atic austerity.
In countries with “controlled insta
bility,” like Venezuela, the macroeconom ic situation persisted with
sim m ering inflation and large pub
lic sector deficits (in this case abet
ted by an anem ic oil industry).
Several aborted coups d ’etat in 1992
only betrayed the weakness o f the
civilian regim e. In m oderately infla
tionary countries like Mexico, stabi
lization was m ore effective. E ither
way, m ost Latin Am erican countries
em barked on stiff anti-inflationary
campaigns.
But the big policy shift came with
the massive privatization o f state
firms across the region. T here is a
crucial link between d eb t m anage
m ent and selling public assets.
D ebtors aim ed to line treasury cof
fers (thereby closing the fiscal gap)
and restock central bank reserves
(and thereby giving governm ents
desperately needed foreign
exchange). F urtherm ore, debtequity swapping (the exchange of
shares in form er public enterprises
Hemisphere
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in retu rn for old foreign d e b t), a
p referred m eans to finance privati
zation, allowed Latin Am erican gov
ernm ents to slash the overall princi
pal.
These policy moves coincided
with structural changes in world
capital. First, at the behest o f the
U.S. and British governm ents, finan
cial m arkets were substantially liber
alized. Barriers to entry o f new
investors and m oney m anagers
d ro p p ed while restrictions on the
range o f financial institutions’ activi
ties were removed. Walls between
banking, securities, trust and insur
ance com panies quickly disap
peared, creating a wide diversity of
m oney managers. T he old world of
com m ercial bank authority over
m oney centers began to collapse as
it was exposed to intense com peti
tion.
Second, governm ents in money
centers slashed transaction costs on
international nonbank capital flows.
In the U.S., for instance, “Regula
tion S” enabled developing coun
tries’ securities to be issued in U.S.
capital m arkets w ithout paying steep
registration fees. Rule 144A relaxed
stipulations th at securities buyers
hold their investm ent for at least
two years, thereby increasing the
liquidity o f their holdings. Both
reform s were passed in 1990. Japan
and Switzerland followed with simi
lar measures.
C hart I is a graphic representa
tion of proportional distribution of
lending in Latin America. W hereas
com m ercial banks were the over
whelm ing source o f external
finance to Latin America in 1982,
their business was drastically
reduced a decade later. In turn, for
eign direct investm ent (FDI - out
right offshore ownership o f assets
within Latin A m erica), rose - this,
in contrast to the global decline in
FDI. FDI has now becom e the
largest single source o f external
funding to developing countries,
m uch o f it linked to privatization.
32 Hemisphere
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Chart I: Distribution o f Capital Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean
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Most rem arkable was the coterie of
new private interm ediaries in p o rt
folio equity and bond markets.
From 1990 to 1993, private capital
flows from lenders to the develop
ing world rose by 250 percent. Most
o f it was concentrated in m iddleincom e countries. In 1993 alone,
total debt stock of developing coun
tries rose by $90 billion. Some of
this reflected reconversion o f old
debts. For instance, the capitaliza
tion o f interest (folding accum ulat
ed interest arrears into the principal
o f the loan while rescheduling its
m aturity and new interest rate)
alone raised T hird World debt
stocks by $15 billion in 1993 (and it
is estim ated that an o th er $10 billion
in interest arrears rem ain outstand
ing) . Debt stocks nonetheless
rem ain high and are rising. By
1994, total disbursem ents of debts
in Latin Am erica were significantly
higher than they were in 1982, in
some countries by as m uch as 50
percent.
C hanging rules in world capital
m arkets increased the range and
flexibility o f financial instrum ents
and perm itted Latin Am erican bor
rowers to broaden the spectrum of

capital sources. But as early as 1991,
the IMF itself w arned th at this
em erging system would pose new
difficulties for financial supervision.
T

he

C u r r e n t C r is is

Much o f the recent profile of
lending and borrow ing activity
resem bles earlier patterns o f capital
flows. Prior to the 1970s, Latin
A m erica’s private sector was the
largest destination for external
funds, and, m ore importantly, capi
tal flowed through an array of n o n 
bank channels. Borrowing and
lending transpired through an
atom ized and relatively uninvigilat
ed system. It would seem that, with
the dem ise o f the com m ercial
banks, we have re tu rn ed to earlier
form s on nonequity capital flows.
This has im portant im plications for
d ebt m anagem ent.
T here is a fu rth er historical paral
lel. Just as capital flowed to Latin
America during the OECD slump of
the 1970s, and flowed out with the
N orth Atlantic recovery o f the mid1980s, the rem igration o f capital to
big Latin Am erican borrowers was
contingent upon a dow nturn in the
OECD beginning in 1989. The

Features: Debt Crisis

inveterate pursuit o f higher returns,
even at the cost o f higher risk, led
investors to boom ing offshore cen
ters in the so-called em erging m ar
kets (H ong Kong, Singapore,
Mexico City and Buenos Aires being
am ong the m ost lucrative - at least
until 1994). T he recent econom ic
recovery in the N orth Atlantic and,
since early 1994, rising interest rates
have prom pted, once again, capital
rem igration to the core. This was
one o f the underlying causes of
M exico’s recent troubles.
The o th er cause, ju st as in the
1880s and 1920s, was the role of
capital flows to correct current
account imbalances. Across the
region a com bination o f low dom es
tic savings, overvalued exchange
rates and reluctance to sterilize the
effects o f massive capital inflows
p rom oted yawning trade deficits.
M exico’s deficit, by far the T hird
W orld’s m ost outstanding, is estimat
ed to have to p p ed $30 billion in
1994, followed by C hina then
Argentina. Sustainable as long as
n et capital flows favored debtors,
the im balance was thrown into sud
den relief once m oney began flow
ing in the opposite direction. The
result was that Mexican Central
Bankers quickly ran down their
reserves in an effort to defend the
peso (largely to see the ruling PRI
through the elections).
O nce again, the confluence of
dom estic policy decisions and inter
national econom ic cycles com bined
to direct capital flows, first into and
then o u t o f d eb to r countries. This
conjuncture, however, differs from
its predecessor of the early 1980s.
W hat has changed is the personal
ity o f finance capital. T he dom i
nant actors resem ble m uch m ore
the profile p rio r to the 1960s, of
heterogeneous and relatively atom 
ized lenders to an equally disparate
array o f borrowers. W hat m ade the
first and second phases o f the 1980s
adjustm ent work was the facility to
overcome coordination problem s.

Debts could be renegotiated am ong
a small coterie o f large banks
engaged with sovereign debtors.
Now, however, borrow ers come
largely from the private sector and
cannot easily displace their insol
vency on to taxpayers or consum ers,
as Latin Am erican governm ents did
in the 1980s. M exico’s giant con
glom erates, G rupo Sidek and
G rupo Financiero Banam ex, are on
the verge o f financial collapse and
threaten to eviscerate the co u n try ’s
financial structure. Similar firm s in
A rgentina, Brazil and Venezuela are
teetering.
Likewise, on the creditor side, the
form ation o f co h eren t blocs is prov
ing impossible. President C linton’s
desperate effort to cobble together
loan guarantees was designed to
shore up investor confidence and

prevent a stam pede ou t o f Mexican
securities. T he very heterogeneity
of m oney m anagers and skittishness
of petty investors inhibits any coop
eration. T he result is - rath er than
rollover debts as in the 1980s volatile financiers are calling in
their loans to Latin America.
T he com bination of institutional
atom ization o f financial actors and
the great volatility o f capital flows
makes this d ebt crisis b oth very dif
ferent and extrem ely dangerous.
After a decade o f deregulating o f
global finance, it rem ains to be seen
w hether central bankers and in ter
national m onetary authorities have
the instrum ents to cope with actors
they themselves helped create. If
not, we may be facing circum 
stances m ore analogous to 1929
than 1982. ■
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Waiting for the Promised Land
Victor Uribe

grarian reform is a
Latin American fixa
tion. Ecologists, peas
ants, guerrillas, and
Indians challenge
landowners, ranchers,
gold hunters, and governm ent - all
in the nam e of land. So what hap
pened to agrarian reform? What
became of the many attem pts to
modify the structure o f land tenure
in Latin America? W hat is the future
of agrarian reform across the region?
Four cases indicative of distinct
approaches and different epochs in
the developm ent of agrarian reform
u n d er non-socialist regimes will pro
vide some answers.
M e x ic o

Thanks to revolutionary mobiliza
tion and progressive populist govern
m ent coalitions, extensive agrarian
reform s were carried out in Mexico
for decades, especially in the 1930s.
From the Mexican Revolution until
the early 1990s, millions of hectares
of land were transferred to ejidos or
com m unal farms. By 1991, 43 per
cent of all farm land and 60 percent
of the farmers (3 million families)
were organized into ejidos, of which
there are currently about 22,000.
Alongside the collective ejidos,
there are num erous small private
farms. Today about 50 percent of
Mexico’s farm land is privately owned
and some 15 percent o f it is in
parcels o f five hectares of less. A
good part of the rem ainder is made
up of o th er “small property;” ceilings
limiting the am ount of privately
owned land were established in 1971.

Victor Uribe is assistant professor of his
tory at Florida International University.
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However, peasant families have not
generally escaped poverty. Part of
the land distributed to them was of
inferior quality, and extension ser
vices have been inadequate. Many
landless families m ust supplem ent
their incom e through other revenuegenerating activities (handicraft pro
duction being a key one) on a micro
scale. Proprietors o f m odern com
mercial farms (over 100 hectares),
particularly in the north and north
west of the country, generally pro
duce crops for export and have
enjoyed better fortunes. They have
benefited from policies aim ed at
agrarian m odernization, especially
irrigation districts, subsidized credit
and technological assistance.
The Mexican governm ent recently
resolved to put a stop to agrarian
reform and even enacted measures
aimed at reversing some standing
legislation. As part of the neoliberal
reform s intended to m odernize
Mexico’s economy, a 1992 constitu
tional am endm ent ended land distri
bution and introduced mechanisms
that m ade it possible for both local
and foreign corporations to hold
and work rural lands. The am end
m ent also allows ejido lands to be
leased or sold at supervised prices.
The end of land distribution in
Mexico has come at a m om ent of
increasing rural unrest, particularly
in Chiapas, where at least one-third
of the 1.5 million local Indians have
no land. In fact, Mexican authorities
estimate that in the year following
the Zapatista National Liberation
Army’s 1994 revolt, the region’s land
less were responsible for about 2,000
seizures of private cattle ranches and
coffee lands. Although some land
may be redistributed in Chiapas for
the sake of political expediency, the

governm ent’s neoliberal economic
program s preclude further land dis
tribution in the rest o f the country
and aim instead at “m odernizing”
agriculture by increasing its com m er
cial dimension. Agriculture’s m od
ernization and commercialization
will likely lead to land concentration.
C o l o m b ia

The first true “agrarian social
reform law” was enacted in 1961
after a long bargaining process
between Liberals and Conservatives,
thus anticipating a wave of Alliance
for Progress-sponsored reforms that
came into vogue during the 1960s.
Policies were no t a response to for
eign pressure but to the urgent need
to restore peace and legitimacy after
the protracted civil war that engulfed
the country from 1948 until the
1960s. Some major haciendas and
regions of significant latifundia were
targeted. The governm ent also
sponsored peasant associations as a
way of underm ining opposition from
landowners.
Direct participation o f peasants in
the im plem entation o f the reform
and the delivery of agricultural ser
vices led to the radicalization o f the
peasant groups and produced waves
of land invasions during the early
1970s. T he num ber of redistributed
hectares m ore than tripled from the
1960s to the 1970s. Estimates indi
cate that some 66,000 families gained
access to approximately 1.2 million
hectares as a direct result of the land
struggles o f the 1970s. A nother
100,000 families received nearly 1.8
million hectares u n d er less con
tentious circumstances.
The pace of land redistribution
slowed in the late 1970s and early
1980s, and different governments
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used agrarian legislation to push
large-scale landholders into m odern
izing their haciendas. In the mid1980s, agrarian reform surfaced
again during peace talks between the
governm ent and rebels. A proposal
intended to streamline land transfer
was drafted by a commission of
experts. New legislation was
approved in 1985 after a long bar
gaining process that watered down
the original proposal’s progressive
provisions.
Agrarian issues were revived in
1989 when an “agrarian jurisdiction”
was created to resolve conflicts over
rural lands, formerly adjudicated in
the overcrowded civil courts. U nder
recent legislation, some formal land
allocation by the governm ent has
occurred. The main beneficiaries
have been Indian communities, but
extensive de facto colonization of
public lands continues to take place
as landless peasants migrate to fron
tier regions and rainforest areas.
Moreover, in the early 1990s, a new
constitution reiterated the “social
function” o f agrarian property and
provided legal mechanisms (tutelas
or injunctive actions) to redress land
claims by peasants and Indians.
T hough these and o ther pressures
on the part of civilians or arm ed
rebels may lead to some land distrib
ution, the efforts o f the current
Liberal governm ent are geared
towards privatizing public companies
and making labor legislation “flexi
ble.” Land distribution is no t at the
top of the governm ent’s economic
agenda.
E l Sa lv a d o r

A significant agrarian reform was
instituted in El Salvador in 1980 by a
civilian-military ju n ta which had

taken power the year before. The
ju n ta decided that agrarian transfor
m ation would contribute to econom 
ic developm ent and, m ore im por
tantly, was necessary to avert a fullscale civil war.
The reform was scheduled in three
phases. Phase I consisted of the
expropriation o f estates over 500
hectares for conversion into peasant
production cooperatives. Phase II
would have expropriated estates of
100-150 (depending on the soil qual
ity) to 500 hectares. Phase III gave
individual titles to those who worked
land u n d er tenancy agreements. In
Phase I, m ore than 30,000 families
benefited from the expropriation of
nearly 220,000 hectares, 12 percent
of it coffee land.
The political climate did not allow
im plem entation of Phase II; but
m uch later, Phase III was pushed
through amid great difficulty, bene
fiting m ore than 95,000 families who
received about 97,000 hectares. As a
whole, though, there were about
155,000 fewer beneficiary families
and about 425,000 fewer hectares
than originally envisioned. The
entire reform affected nearly 20 per
cent of the country’s land and onequarter of the rural population, yet
left unsolved the landless situation of
a large num ber of peasants.
Peace talks in the early 1990s
included promises o f land for both
form er insurgents and discharged
mem bers of the military. These land
grants were to have come from vol
untary sales by private owners to a
Land Bank or from m em bership in
standing agrarian cooperatives. The
m agnitude o f the distribution actual
ly carried out u n d er such agree
m ents is unknown, but in the early
m onths o f 1995 there were num er

ous street clashes and seizures o f gov
ernm ent buildings by individuals
(particularly form er m em bers o f the
army) who dem anded compliance
with the peace accords, especially
provisions concerning the distribu
tion of land. Like the rest o f Latin
America, the governm ent of El
Salvador is privatizing, and anything
other than the m inim um land
required to solve immediate political
crises is unlikely.
B r a z il

Agrarian legislation was first enact
ed in 1964 under a military govern
m ent, but changes to the structure of
land tenure were not significant. By
the mid-1980s, official data indicated
that 70 percent of farm land in Brazil
was m ade up of latifundia (estates
over 1,200 hectares) and only 8 per
cent was m ade up o f family farms.
Furtherm ore, the 2 percent o f rural
properties with m ore than 1,000
hectares occupied 57 percent of the
agricultural land in 1985. Thirty per
cent o f farms smaller than ten
hectares accounted for only 1 per
cent o f farm land. Finally, during
1974-1984, holdings of less than 10
hectares saw their share of farm land
fall from 1.2 to 1.0 percent, whereas
the area occupied by estates with
m ore than 1,000 hectares rose from
48 to 57 percent. This all suggests a
continuing pattern o f land concen
tration and inequity.
Rural violence paralleled land con
centration, particularly during the
1980s. Evictions, land-grabbing,
estate occupations, and peasant resis
tance escalated. Thousands of rural
farm ers have been assassinated. The
huge flow of internal landless immi
grants flocking towards the new fron
tiers in Amazonia (Acre, Amazonas,
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One
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Rondonia, Roraima) has also acceler
ated environm ental destruction.
Following a long period of military
rule, a new civilian governm ent pro
posed agrarian legislation in 1985.
U nder pressure from the Uniao
Democratica Ruralista (UDR), a pow
erful landowners group organized to
neutralize the new agrarian mea
sures, the legislation rendered many
properties (i.e., rural enterprises,
small family farms, “productive”
farms regardless of size) ineligible
for expropriation. New laws enacted
in 1987 (by which time UDR had 150
branches throughout Brazil and
nearly 230,000 members) added fur
ther restrictions, limiting the am ount
to be expropriated to 75 percent of
an estate’s extension and m andating
that landowners be com pensated
with financially attractive debt bonds.
After further pressures from the
landowners lobby, Brazil’s new 1988
constitution also included relatively
vague and weak provisions concern
ing the expropriation o f agrarian
properties not “fulfilling their social
purpose.”
In spite o f the many delays and
limitations, by the early 1990s mil
lions o f hectares and thousands of
families had been affected by the
new agrarian reform laws of Brazil
(see table). Num erous latifundia
occupied by peasant farm ers and
rainforest areas claimed by Indian
com m unities were especially targeted
for redistribution. The scale of
agrarian problem s in Brazil is gigan
tic and far from disappearing, but
the governm ent has done m ore
about land issues in the last decade
than ever before. Furtherm ore,
because o f the dynamic nature of
peasant organization, mobilization
and pressure, it is likely that agrarian
reform will continue to advance in
Brazil. Cardoso’s governm ent is
com m itted to deepening neoliberal
reform s in Brazil, but it also seems
com m itted to addressing social
needs, land being a critical one.
Recently, it announced the distribu
36 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One

Summary Table: Agrarian Reform in Four Latin American Countries
Country

Mexico
Colombia
El Salvador
Brazil*

Main Reform
Period

# Hectares
Distributed

#Families
Benefitted

*1917-1990

93,000,000

3,000,000

1962-1979

5,856,900+

253,4150

1980s

315,132

79,436

1964-1989

4,200,000

81,0000

Gini
Coeff.

.70

.86

Sources: William C. T hiesenhusen ed.. Searchingfor Agrarian Reform in Latin America (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1989); Roy L. Prosterm an, Mary N. Tem ple and Tim othy M. H anstad eds.,
Agrarian Reform and Grass Roots Development. Ten Case Studies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990) ;
Susan R. Walsh Sanderson, Land Reform in Mexico: 1910-1980 (O rlando: Academic Press,
1984); Leon Zaxnosc, The Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movement in Colombia. Struggles of
the National Peasant Association. 1967-1981 (New York: Cambridge, 1986); U nited Nations
Developm ent Program , H um an D evelopm ent R eport (New York, 1993).
* approxim ate figures
tcom bines land redistribution and allocation o f titles o f public land

tion of 110 fazendas in the states of
Para, M aranhao, and Parana am ong
20,000 landless families. While
expropriating two large haciendas in
the n o rth ern state o f Ceara in late
March, the governm ent also
announced that, by 1998, 280,000
m ore families will receive 11 million
hectares of land.
W a it in g

for the

P r o m is e d L a n d

In Latin America, land reform has
been a response to revolutionary or
pre-revolutionary situations, rural
violence, and foreign pressures - that
is, a political expedient. Even where
there has been extensive land reform
(i.e., Mexico), conflict lingers.
T here continues to be the sense that
the system o f land tenure is disadvan
tageous to a large segment o f the
population. Rural poverty still stems
to a large extent from inequitable
distribution of farmland.
In spite of continuing tensions in
the countryside, every case, except
perhaps Brazil’s (and the case of
Guatemala, no t exam ined h ere), also
suggests that, unless specific and iso
lated political crises dictate the distri

bution of some land to calm particu
larly belligerent social groups, acrossthe-board land reform policy is a
thing of the past. Today the trend is
to favor m odernization over land
redistribution, which Alain de Janvry
had nam ed as one of the key obsta
cles to dem ocratization of land own
ership in Latin America.
Neoliberalism, which assumes that
economies of scale and high rates of
capitalization are required to maxi
mize agrarian productivity, will rein
force the m odernization option. It
will dem and support for agribusi
ness, agrarian corporations, efficient
commercial agriculture and so forth,
and will look with suspicion at any
state attem pt to invest public funds
in subsistence farms, indem nification
of expropriated landowners and
social program s in the countryside.
Yet, as the neoliberal m odel starts to
unravel, and m ounting social ten
sions becom e unm anageable, it is
likely that new coalitions will emerge
to push forward agrarian reform
once more. Until then, many Latin
Americans will have to continue wait
ing for the prom ised land. ■
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Out of Many, One Yard
Bruce Loshusan

Herbert, Worker in the Broum Sugar Room, Kingston, 1992

Jamaican-born Bruce Loshusan is a freelance photographer based out of New York City. His series on Jamaica was shown this Spring at FIU.
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Stephanie, Kingston, 1992
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Photo Essay: Jamaica

Boys Swimming in Port Royal, Kingston, 1993
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Photo Essay: Jamaica

Tony in the “M*A*S*H” T-shirt, Kingston, 1993
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Photo Essay: Jamaica

Clothesline in Port Royal, Kingston, 1994
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Photo Essay: Jamaica

“The Lord is My Shepherd”Juice Cart, Kingston, 1994
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Photo Essay: Jamaica

Tony in the Outside Shower, Kingston, 1994
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Photo Essay: Jamaica

Tree Roots, Kingston, 1994
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Photo Essay: Jamaica

Ma Ma, Kingston, 1993

46 Hemisphere

•

Volume Seven, Number One

Photo Essay: Jamaica

Young Girl from “ConcreteJungle” Series, Kingston, 1994
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Landscape of a Revolution
D am ian Fernandez

The Cuban Revolution:
Origins, Course, and Legacy
By Marifeli Perez-Stable;New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993, 236 pp.
f Marifeli Perez-Stable were a
painter, she would have been
an impressionist. The ability
to paint the nuances of the lit
tle pictures that form the big
picture is the hallm ark of her
book The Cuban Revolution: Origins,
Course, and Legacy. This is a book of
connections and missed connec
tions, o f what has been and what
could have been, a m asterpiece of
scholarship.
T he first missed connection the
author attem pts to address is
between the study of Cuba and the
study o f o th er countries in Latin
America. Why has Cuba been
neglected in many landm ark studies
on the region’s politics and econom 
ics? Why have scholars presum ed
the island’s exceptional nature,
instead of testing it? Why have theo
retical debates largely excluded the
Cuban case? Perez-Stable successful
ly argues that Cuba must be brought
into the m ainstream of scholarship
and sets out to connect h er case
study to the broader literature on
developm ent.
Perez-Stable connects the dots of
history, politics, economics, society
and international relations that have
produced the Cuban revolutionary
landscape since 1959. She brings
together the interaction of individu
als, elites, and structures and sheds
light on the past, present and future

I

Damian Fernandez is associate professor
of international relations at Florida
International University.
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of the island’s political system. Only
through the m ultiple levels of analy
sis can one understand the logic of
the Fidel-Patria-Revolucion equation
that appealed to the popular classes
during the early 1960s. T hat equa
tion was a product of the support of
the lower segments of the Cuban
social system and the inability of eco
nom ic elites to mobilize a counterre
sponse. C oupled with anti-U.S. sen
tim ent on the island and the Cold
War, the Fidel-Patria-Revolucion com
bination found an acceptable part
ner in the Soviet Union.
The Cuban Revolution also connects
the m aterial factors determ inant in
C uba’s developm ent with less tangi
ble variables like conciencia (i.e. “rev
olutionary consciousness”). But
dim ensions are no t the only ones
included in the study. T he tensions
within and between institutions and
organizations, as well as the charis
matic basis of fidelista leadership,
also surface as relevant factors which
explain the course of events. The
author devotes particular attention
to labor unions and the Federation
of C uban Women.
According to Perez-Stable, the ori
gins of radical social change are to
be found in the failure o f reform ism
in the decades prior to the 1960s.
Although this is not necessarily an
original argum ent, no one has m ade
it as thoroughly. She adds a twist to
the argum ent by pointing out
opportunities that reformists and
the econom ic elites failed to take.
By shedding light on alternatives
that never materialized, the book
underscores the agency and the lim
its o f political protagonists. Con
trary to many o th er scholars who
perceived the C uban revolution as
inevitable, Perez-Stable underscores

that history is m ade m om ent by
m om ent by the decisions of individ
uals within the constraints im posed
by structures. Between the lines the
au th o r’s preference for a different
outcom e shows, although PerezStable does n o t take into account
the fact that o ther alternatives would
also have unleashed their own set of
unexpected and equally unpalatable
consequences.
The failure of reform ist national
ism polarized society. Particularly
after the 1940s, the political m iddle
ground in Cuba proved, time after
time, an elusive quest. This legacy
still haunts the political culture of
the island and its Diaspora. But if
the past was not predestined, nei
ther is the future. Like variations of
the same object u n d er different
light, Perez-Stable concludes that
the interplay between individuals
and structures can produce a variety
of outcomes. Perez-Stable dem on
strates how the same leaders and
logic that prom oted social change
eventually closed that space; how a
legitimate state finds its legitimacy
slowly eroding. T he revolutionary
unity which initially signalled popu
lar support for a com m on front
against all odds becam e a useful pre
text for suppressing dissent and plu
ralism while sustaining some individ
uals and institutions in power.
The final connection this book
makes is that between the past and
the future of the island. The FidelPatria-Revolucion is exhausted. As in
the early years o f the revolution, the
challenge o f the 1990s is to compose
a new form of governance. W hether
the course will lead to polarization
and conflict, or toward a m ediated
solution will be decided as actors
make and miss connections. ■

Clementina Suarez:
Her Life and Poetry

The Sandinista Legacy:
Lessons from a Political
Economy in Transition

Janet N. Gold
"M asterful storytelling___ I found myself riveted to
the pages, eager to learn more about Suarez's life.
. . . W ith in the first pages of the prologue, the reader
feels included in th is very private w orld. One of the
greatest m erits of the text is Gold's own prose,
elegant and poetic in its own right."
— Nancy Saporta Sternbach, Smith College
341 pp. 34 b & w photos, notes, bibliog., index.
Cloth, $49,95

llja A. Luciak

Peinaldo Arenas:
The Pentagonia

"Im portant contributions not only to the comparative
literature o f regime transitions (particularly 'post
socialist' transitions), but also to the study of
Nicaragua and Central Am erica___ Presents a
nicely balanced picture o f the Sandinista record of
accomplishments and failures, including a w e llreasoned analysis o f w ho or w h a t w as to blame for
the failures."— Richard Tardanico,
Florida International University
258 pp. 30 tables, m ethodological appendix, notes,
bibliog., index. Cloth, $49.95

Francisco Soto

Puerto feed: The Archaeology
of a Sixteenth-Century
Spanish Town in Hispaniola

"A major contribution to the field of contemporary
Cuban narrative___ Soto brings a solid knowledge
of Arenas's work and a demonstrated aptitude to
w rite w ith clarity and originality on a most d ifficu lt
and extraordinary novelist."— Reinaldo Sanchez,
Florida International University
1994. 216 pp. Notes, bibliog., index. Cloth, $24.95

Essays on Cuban History:
Historiography and Research

Edited by Kathleen Deagan

Louis A. Perez, Jr.

"A superb presentation of a critically im portant
archaeological site. It's a seamless synthesis of
Hispanic historical sources [that] effectively ties the
events played out at Puerto Real to the fifteenthand sixteenth-century global geopolitical scene."
— David Hurst Thomas, curator of anthropology,
American Museum of Natural History
Columbus Quincentenary Series/Ripley P. Sullen
Series/Florida Museum of Natural History/
University of Florida. 560 pp. 165 figures, 62 tables,
glossary, references, index. Cloth, $75.00

"A book of immense u tility to those w ho are, or plan
to become, students and scholars of Cuban history
and society___ Both an overview and a handbook
combined into one accessible, w e ll-w ritte n
volum e."— Rebecca J. Scott, University of M ichigan
320 pp. Notes, index. Cloth, $44.95

Cuba at a Crossroads:
Politics and Economics after
the Fourth Party Congress
Edited by Jorge F. Perez-Lopez
"Extremely useful to scholars and readers interested
in Latin America, socialist countries in transition,
U.S. foreign policy, comparative political and
economic systems, [and] revolutionary change___
W ill be an excellent textbook in courses related to
those subjects."— Carmelo Mesa-Lago,
University o f Pittsburgh
1994. 300 pp.
Tables, notes, bibliog., index.
a
Cloth, $39.95

The Beinecke Lesser Antilles
Collection at Hamilton College:
A Catalogue of Books,
Manuscripts, Prints, Maps,
and Drawings, I52I-I860
Prepared by Samuel J. Hough
and Penelope R. 0. Hough
"A classic reference book___ The Beinecke
Collection is renowned for its importance and
thoroughness, for including major early rarities as
w e ll as modern ephemera. This description of the
collection is accurate in detail and thorough in
coverage."— Roger E. Stoddard, Curator of Rare
Books, Harvard College Library
1994.426 pp. 8 1 /2 X 1 1 .1 b&w, 2 color photographs,
3 maps, notes, biblog., index. Cloth, $150.00

Cuban Art and National
Identity: The Vanguardia
Painters, I927-I950
Juan A. M artinez
"Surely the m ost complete book on Cuban
modernism to be published in English or Spanish. It
w ill be indispensable to both the scholar and the
general reader."— Julio Blanc, art historian
• "The most com plete and lucid discussion of the
vanguardia painters of the 1920s and 1930s
available anywhere."— Louis A. P6rez, Jr.,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
1994. 216 pp. 52 b&w, 8 color plates (of paintings),
notes, bibliog., index. Cloth, $34.95
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Latin American Foreign Debt
M arian Goslinga

atin A m erica’s foreign
debt has been steadily
on the rise. According
to the World Bank, the
region owed US$529 bil
lion in 1994, a 14 per
cent increase since 1989, and some
analysts fear that a new debt crisis
could be developing. Brazil, Mexico,
Nicaragua, H onduras, Argentina,
Bolivia, Peru, E cuador and Cuba
have been classified as “severely
en d eb ted .” A survey o f the litera
ture reveals that academic interest
in the subject has waned consider
ably since the crisis years, but will
probably intensify when and if the
situation worsens. According to the
Hispanic American Periodicals Index
(better known as HAPI), in 1989,
there were 89 articles written on the
Latin Am erican foreign debt. In
1993, this nu m b er had dwindled to
15. The following is a list of recent
publications on the subject, describ
ing the situation in the various
countries of the region.
All Eyes on Latin America. Riordan
Roett. Chief Executive No. 100
(January/F ebruary 1995), p. 23.
America Latina: economia e historicidad. N orm an Palma. Bogota:
Indigo Ediciones; 1994. 153 pp.
[Discusses the debt issue from a
Colom bian standpoint.]
America Latina: el desarrollo en
tiempos del neoliberalismo. Gustavo
D. Dans. Montevideo: EPPAL; 1994.
135 pp.

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American
and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.
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As Latin Economies Boom,
Commercial Banks Cautiously
Re-Enter Loan Market. Paul Kilby.
Latin Finance, no. 63 (Decem ber
1994), pp. 49-52. [Describes the
renew ed interest of international
banks to venture into the area due
to the success of the Brady debt
agreem ents.]
Au Chili, les sirenes de l’oubli et les
dividendes du liberalisme: sous la
chape du conformisme. B ernard
Cassen. Le Monde Diplomatique, v. 42
(February 1995), pp. 8-9. [Focuses
on the effects on the economy of
new policies o f dem ocratization and
the legacy and rem nants o f authori
tarianism.]
Brasil-FMI: fr u str a te s e perspectivas. G esner Oliveira. Sao Paulo:
Bienal; 1993. 192 pp. [Discusses
relations with the International
M onetary Fund regarding the debt
crisis and econom ic stabilization.]
The Capital Inflows Problem:
Concepts and Issues. Guillerm o A.
Calvo, Leonardo Leiderm an,
C arm en M. R einhart. San
Francisco, CA: ICS Press; 1994.
27 pp. [This occasional paper by
the International C enter for
Econom ic Growth com pares the
Latin Am erican situation to that of
Southeast Asia.]
Capital Markets and Developing
Country Firms: Latin America
and the Caribbean. Jack Glen,
Brian Pinto. Finance and
Development, v. 32, no. 1 (March
1995), pp. 40-44. [Discusses the
renewed interest in external financ
ing am ong well established local
firms.]

The Caribbean in the Global
Political Economy. H ilbourne A.
Watson, ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner; 1994. 261 pp. [Analyzes
restructuring, globalization and
regional issues affecting the
Caribbean.]
Central Banking After the Latin
American Debt Crisis. Arm inio
Fraga. Columbia Journal of World
Business, v. 29 (Sum m er 1994),
p. 66-70. [Discusses the central
banks o f A rgentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela
and their contribution to econom ic
stability.]
El clima de los negocios, 1994-1995:
balance y perspectivas de la
economia colombiana. Saul Pineda
Hoyos, Javier B. C adena Lozano.
Revista de la Camara de Comercio de
Bogota (Septem ber 1994), pp. 29-37.
[Describes C olom bia’s business cli
m ate and the policy orientations of
the Gaviria adm inistration.]
Comentarios al documento de criterios generales de politica economi
ca, 1994. A rturo H uerta G.
Investigacion Economica, v. 54
(January-March 1994), pp. 45-70.
[Assesses econom ic growth and poli
cies in Mexico, 1983-1993.]
La crisis y la deuda externa en
America Latina. Jorge Enrique
Rom ero Perez. San Jose, Costa
Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de
Costa Rica; 1993. 231 pp. [Com
pilation of articles by the author
previously published.]
The Debt Requires More Service.
W alter R. Spurrier. Weekly Analysis,
v. 24, no. 39 (O ctober 1994), pp.

N

401-407. [Examines E cuador’s pub
lic sector expenditures and discusses
the foreign d eb t service. According
to the Brady Plan rescheduling
agreem ent, interest payments will
increase from 4.0 p ercent o f GDP in
1994 to 4.4 percent of GDP in 1995.]
Debt-for-Nature Swaps and the
Limits to International Cooperation
on Behalf o f the Environment.
Jan een Klinger. Environmental
Politics, v. 3 (Sum m er 1994), pp.
229-246.
Democracy, Markets, and Structural
Reform in Latin America: Argen
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and
Mexico. William C. Smith, Carlos
H. Acuna, E duardo A. Gamarra,
eds. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers; 1994.
331 pp. [Describes recent econom 
ic reform s in the region.]
Los desafios de la deuda externa y
el desarrollo: a diez anos del inicio
de la crisis. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis.
Estudios Internacionales, v. 26
(April-June 1993), pp. 155-164.
[Traces the developm ent of Latin
Am erica’s foreign debt crisis, 19821992.]

U

D

En Route to Modern Growth: Latin
America in the 1990s; Essays in
Honor o f Carlos Diaz-Alejandro.
Gustav Ranis, ed. Washington, DC:
Johns H opkins University Press;
1994. 160 pp. [Study sponsored by
the Inter-American Developm ent
Bank.]
Estabilizacion, apertura y pobreza
en la Republica Dominicana, 19861992. Andres Dauhajre et al. Santo
Domingo: Ed. Corripio; 1994. 238
pp. [Analysis o f structural adjust
m ent and trade liberalization poli
cies in the Dom inican Republic.]
El Fondo Monetario Internacional y
la deuda externa mexicana: crisis y
estabilizacion. Ricardo Campos. 2a
ed., revisada. Mexico, DF: Plaza y
Valdes Editores; 1993. 276 pp.
[Revised and updated ed. o f a work
on M exico’s relations with the
International M onetary Fund; the
first edition was published in 1991.]
Government Responses to the Latin
American Debt Problem. R obert E.
Gross, ed. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers; 1995.

Did the Debt Crisis or the Oil Price
Decline Cause Mexico’s Investment
Collapse? Andrew M. Warner.
W ashington, DC: Econom ic
Research Dept., World Bank; 1993.
31 pp.

Growth and Inflation in the
Caribbean, 1977-1992. M. K.
Anyadike-Danes. Bulletin of Eastern
Caribbean Affairs, v. 19 (June 1994),
pp. 54-66. [Com pares and exam
ines growth in Barbados to that of
m em bers o f the OECS (Organisa
tion o f Eastern C aribbean States).]

Economic Reforms in Latin America.
H erm ann Sautter, ed. Frankfurt:
Vervuert Verlag; 1993. 169 pp.
[Proceedings o f a symposium held
in November 1992 at the GeorgAugust-Universitat Gottingen.]

How One Big Battle Was Won: The
International Debt Crisis o f 1981-82
and the Mexican 1994 Situation.
William Cline. The Economist, v. 334
(February 1995), pp. 17-20. [Argues
that M exico’s current situation is

A

m uch less serious than the 1982 cri
sis which required a concerted
international bail-out.]
In Default: Peasants, the Debt
Crisis, and the Agricultural
Challenge in Mexico. Marilyn
Gates. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press; 1993. 274 pp.
Indice bibliografico iberoamericano
de economia politica, 1981-1992.
Pensamiento iberoamericano (July
1993/June 1994), pp. 9-666.
[Bibliography of works relating to
econom ic trends and policies in
Latin America, the C aribbean, and
Spain.]
Latin America and the Caribbean in
the 1990s. A rm ando S. Lindo.
Finance and Development, v. 32, no. 1
(March 1995), pp. 2-4.
Latin America’s Economic Future.
G raham Bird, Ann Helwege, eds.
San Diego, CA: Academic Press;
1994. 339 pp. [Examines the dif
ferent ways in which external debts
have been reduced in the region
and lists factors that may en danger
the recovery.]
Macroeconomic Crises, Policies,
and Growth in Brazil, 1964-90.
Donald V. Coes. W ashington, DC:
International Economics Dept.,
World Bank; 1994.
Managing International Debt.
William Cline. The Economist, v. 334
(February 1995), pp. 17-19.
[Focuses on Mexico.]
Mexico After the Debt Crisis: Is
Growth Sustainable? Daniel Oks,
Sweder van W ijnbergen.
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number One

51

P ublications U pdate: Latin A m erican Foreign Debt

W ashington, DC: International
Economics Dept., World Bank:
1994. 42 pp. [Argues that the
Brady Plan is prim arily responsible
for the country’s econom ic expan
sion.]

Revista de Informafdo Legislativa, v. 31
(July/Septem ber 1994), pp. 129148. [Discusses certain constitution
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